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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS
By

GERALD

H. KOPEL*

Real estate brokers, a mining prospector, officers of a large
corporation, an attorney who drank too much, and a lady on an
operating table combined to make this an interesting year in the
field of Business Associations.
AGENCY

A. Real Estate Brokers
In Nunnally v. Hilderman,' the supreme court affirmed the
fact that the English language does not always have the same meaning in law as it does to the layman. Here was considered the authority of a bank, acting as agent, "to sell" real estate. The principal
contended the bank had no authority to bind the principal to convey, and the supreme court agreed.
The Colorado Statute of Frauds provides that every instrument
required to be subscribed by any party for the sale of real estate
may be subscribed by the agent of such party, lawfully authorized
2
in writing.
Written instructions in general terms, "to sell" real estate, when
placed in the hands of an agent confer authority upon the agent
only to produce a purchaser to buy upon terms offered by the principal.' The agent has no authority over the title "unless he is specifically authorized in writing to bind the title or to enter into a contract binding the owner to convey the title '4 or "to execute an eyecutory contract for the sale of real estate." As a special agent, or
an agent with specific authority to deal in real estate, "any person
dealing with him is bound at his peril to learn the extent of that
authority. ' 6 The supreme court held that the agent was given no
such specific authority in writing under the evidence presented, nor
was there any ratification of the acts of the bank by the principal
based upon knowledge of all material facts.7
In Garrett v. Richards,S real estate broker was granted a written, exclusive, irrevocable right for a specified period of time to
sell owner's home. The agreement, accepted in writing by broker,
provided that in case of sale by owner, broker, or any person during
the period of the listing, broker would be entitled to his commission.
Broker advertised the property and expended other efforts to produce a sale. Owner notified broker to take the property off the market because he had decided not to sell. Broker, within the specified
Member of the Denver firm of Kopel and Kopel.
1 373 P.2d 940 (Colo. 1962).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 59-1.8, -9 (1953).
.2 Springer v. City Bank and Trust Co., 59 Colo. 376, 149 Pac 253 (1915).
-1 Stark v. Rogers, 69 Colo. 98, 106, 169 Pac. 146, 148 (1917).
5 Johnson v. Lennox, 55 Colo. 125, 129, 133 Pac 744, 746 (1913).
6 Id. at 130, 133 Pac. at 746.
7 Even though the principal stated in a letter that she was agreeable to a sale to purchaser for
the specified price, the letter stated further that principal "does not know the contents of the agreement entered into between" bank and purchaser. "Please advise what was contracted for . . . and
what is customary under similar circumstances." 373 P.2d 940, 943 (Colo. 1962).
S 369 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1962).
*
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period of time, then produced a buyer ready, willing and able to
buy upon terms set forth in the listing. Owner refused to sell. Is
the owner liable to broker for the amount of commission broker
would have received if the sale had taken place? The supreme court
said yes, in a decision which establishes definite Colorado rules concerning irrevocable listings.
The issue is whether an "irrevocable" contract is binding, and
whether it is revocable. Owner maintained the contract was "nudum pactum," unilateral and unenforceable as an executory contract because of lack of consideration as of the time he notified
broker to take the property off the market. The court agreed that
the contract was not binding "until some service is rendered by the
broker looking to the sale of the property."9 It becomes binding
"when the broker expends money or performs services in furtherance of his own and the owners' purposes," 10 stated the court. This
partial performance of the main consideration, which is the sale,
is sufficient to make the contract binding. Another factor considered by the court is that the exclusive, irrevocable contract must
be for a reasonable specified time.11
This decision, while justifiable and equitable from the viewpoint of the broker,' 2 might be considered contrary to the general
spirit of principal-agency law concerning irrevocable agencies. We
are not speaking of the right of a broker to receive his commission
upon the production of a buyer, or to sue for damages, but rather
of the power of a principal to terminate an agency. The principal,
in an ordinary agency, always has the power, though not the legal
right to fire an agent. The principal is, of course, liable in damages
if the firing is not justified under the terms of the contract. But if
the agency is irrevocable,
then the principal has no power to termi13
nate the agency.
Certainly there can be no dispute with the court's con'ention
that the expending of money or performance of service made this
contract one that was binding and enforceable for purposes of a
suit for damages. The question remains as to whether the incurring
of expenses in and about the business of the agency, under terms
of a contract such as this one, should bar the power (as it bars the
right) of the seller to revoke the contract.
An irrevocable agency is not normally terminated by death or
other operations of law which terminate an ordinary agency.1 4
Query: Does this mean that an individual broker, operating under
the Garrett rule, may die before the end of a specified time limitation of the irrevocable contract and that his estate may complete
the contract and obtain the commission?
In City of Pueblo v. Leach Realty Co.,' 5 the defendant city,
having some old airport land to sell, appointed all licensed real
9 Id. at 568.
10 Ibid.
11 The listing was from January 31 to April 31, and then extended to May 31. Buyer was
produced on May 27.
12 The court differentiates Garrett v. Richardson from Lambert v. Hoskins, 128 Colo. 473, 263 P.2d
433 (1953). In the Lambert case, an exclusive agency to sell did not eliminate a sale by the owner
himself, and there was no liability to the broker for a commission if owner sold. The exclusive
agency only forbade the sale by another agent, without a commission going to broker. The language in the Garrett contract was such that a commission was due broker no matter who sold
the property.
13 12 C.J.S. Brokers, Section 16b, p. 46.
14 12 C.J.S. Brokers, Section 16c, p. 49.
15 368 P.2d 195 (Colo. 1962).
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estate brokers in the city as its non-exclusive sales agents. Plaintiff
submitted what amounted to an acceptance of the city's terms and
conditions for purchase of the entire tract by plaintiff's client. On
the same day, but apparently at a later hour, another broker submitted an offer to purchase. The second offer, combined with a third
offer of another firm made at a later date, was accepted by the city
council.
Plaintiff sued for his commission, and was awarded $17,535.
The supreme court approved the jury verdict, holding that the
transaction with plaintiff's client "failed only because the defendant
failed and refused to perform its part of the agreement and not because of any act of the broker or purchaser. If a seller does not perform once a qualified buyer is produced by his broker the seller
cannot escape the payment of the agreed commission. '""
The court cites 12 CJS Brokers, Section 92, page 213: "Where
several independent brokers are employed to effect the same transaction, only one commission is to be paid and that is to be paid in
full to the broker
who first succeeds and is the procuring cause of
T
the 'ransaction."
B. Notice and Knowledge
There is a general rule in agency law, subject to some exceptions, that notice or knowledge of an agent is notice or knowledge
of his principal. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has held
that this is not necessarily true, depending on who the agent is.
Thus, in Zika v. Eckel,s notice of a trial setting upon attorney for
the defendant, as provided by Colo. R. Civ. P. 5(b) (1), was not
considered sufficient notice to the defendant "where it is generally
known by both the bench and the bar of the county that the whereabouts of the party's attorney is frequently, and for extended periods of time, unknown, and that the absences from his work are
many times the result of his excessive drinking .

.

.

."". In

such a

situation, the court should order service upon the defendant, states
the supreme court.
Clients of real estate agents do not fare as well, as shown by
2"
Dunklee v. Lederman..
The seller-client of real estate broker approved an offer of purchase on December 9, 1962. Testimony at trial
indica'ed that buyer notified broker on December 8, 1962, that the
offer was withdrawn. Even if the trial testimony was disputed,
broker had knowledge of the withdrawal of offer when he presented
buyer's check for certification and was notified that payment had
been stopped. Seller-client did not have actual knowledge of the
withdrawal of the offer at the time of acceptance, but because broker "had knowledge of the fact . . . his knowledge was imputable

to his principal in law if' ' not in fact, and as such the purported acceptance was a nullity."'
16 Id. at 196.
17 Other real estate agent cases decided in 1962 were Leece v. Griffin, 371 P.2d 264 (Colo.
1962) (statement of a real estate salesman in answer to a question by a proposed purchaser as to
income, was a mere prediction of future income, and the fact that such prediction did not prove
cccurcte was not a basis for maintenance of a fraud action); and Cherry Creek Realty Inc. v.
Amter, 368 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1962) (commissions are paid for achievement, not effort).
tS 372 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1962).
I . Ibid.
2': 374 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962).
21 Id. at 701.
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C. Unlawful Interference with Agency by Third Person
Settlemeyer sued Watson 2 2 for unlawful interference by Watson
with Settlemeyer's oral distributorship contract
for Colorado,
23
granted by Bardahl Manufacturing Corporation..
Watson, who was Bardahl's New Mexico distributor, replaced
Settlemeyer in Colorado under a written contract which contained
several provisions concerning the ouster of Settlemeyer.
The evidence showed Watson had visited the Bardahl offices
just prior to Settlemeyer's termination, and that Watson had previously attempted to trade distributorship areas with Settlemeyer.
During his period as Colorado distributor, Settlemeyer had spent
large sums to advertise and promote Bardahi, and at the time of his
ouster, he had a considerable stock of Bardahl products and promotional materials on hand.
Watson claimed the oral contract between Settlemeyer and
Bardahl was terminable at will, and therefore no possible damages
could accrue. The supreme court conceded the possibility, without
deciding the issue, that Bardahl might have had the right to terminate the contract at will. 24 But even so, stated the court in uphold-

ing the $7,500 damage award to Settlemeyer, "Watson had no right
to induce such an act or to intentionally interfere . . .by promoting

his purpose and intention to take over if Bardahl was successful in
ousting Settlemeyer. ' -. " ... independent contractors or agents ...
have the right to earn a livelihood and to continue their business
unmolested by unwarranted activities of third persons and are entitled 26to protection in equity just like the employees of any business."
There has been an extremely large increase in the number of
exclusive franchise contracts held by businessmen in Colorado dur22 Watson v. Settlemeyer, 372 P.2d 453 (Colo. 1962).
23 Settlemeyer had attempted to sue Bardahl also, on the basis of alleged conspiracy to breach
the oral distributorship contract. However, Bardahl was a foreign corporation which was not doing
business in Colorado, according to the court's decision. Settlemeyer attempted to gain jurisdiction
by serving Bardahl's counsel, who was present as both counsel and witness for Watson, at Watson's trial. The supreme court held that service on an attorney in open court, or on an attorney
appearing specially in a state, is improper unless the attorney has been specifically authorized by
his client to accept service. Further, general employment as an attorney is not sufficient grounds
to serve his client by serving the attorney. (Bardahl Manufacturing Corp. v. District Court, 372
P.2d 447 (Cola. 1962). For another case on what constitutes "transacting or doing business" within
Colorado for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction by service on the secretary of state under CRS
31-35-19(3), see Bay Aviation Services v. District Court, 370 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1962).
"4 " ...
Settlemeyer's accounts with Bardahl were becoming delinquent and Bardahl was be.
coming dissatisfied with Settlcmeyer." 372 P.2d 453, 455.
25 Id. at 456.
26 Ibid.

1963

AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS

ing the past decade, and the cases cited by the supreme court in
reaching this decision should be required reading for any attorney
dealing in this field of law.
D.

Liability for the Torts of Others

In Industrial Comm'n v. Standard Ins. Co.,2

7

plaintiff was em-

ployed as a roughneck. While so employed he sustained an accidental injury to his left arm, breaking a bone in the area of his wrist.
He was treated for this injury by a physician selected by the employer. The treatment resulted in a marked deformity of plaintiff's
left wrist requiring further operative procedure. The court held that
in Colorado, under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer
is liable for the unskillfulness or error of judgment of the physician
furnished as required.
In Moon v. Mercy Hospital,2s however, plaintiff sought to recover damages from Mercy Hospital for an alleged injurious tort.
The complaint alleged that Mercy employed a resident surgeon who
carelessly and negligently diagnosed, treated and operated on plaintiff, and that Mercy was responsible for the resultant damages. The
district court dismissed the action as one not stating a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and the supreme court upheld the
decision. The court's logic is that a hospital is not licensed to practice medicine; the relationship between doctor and patient is personal; the hospital is powerless to command or forbid any act by a
doctor in the practice of his profession; the hospital is not liable
unless it employs those whose want of skill is known, or should be
known to it, or by some special conduct or neglect the hospital
makes itself responsible for their malpractice.
It is the import of our decisions that a licensed physician is the principal when performing medical services in a
hospital. When a doctor diagnoses, treats and operates on a
patient in a hospital, he is in command of these functions,
and the hospital and its employees subserve him in his ministrations to the patient. He has sole and final control ....29
Plaintiff made one fatal error. She should have been an employee of Mercy Hospital, injured on the job. Then Mercy would
have been liable. Perhaps the distinction between the two cases
makes sense under the statutes of our state, but certainly the results appear inequitable. Query: Does our supreme court really believe that a patient has any choice in the selection of a resident
doctor on duty at a hospital?'
27 370 P.2d 156 (Colo. 1962).
2s 373 P.2d 944 (Colo. 1962).
21 Id. at 945, 946.
:30Agency cases of minor import in 1962 were Parent v. Kopanos, 368 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1962) (could
be construed to state that covenants of employees not to compete are not transferable by inference
upon employer's sole of the business even though the seller might remain a third-party benefiiciary
of such covenant); San Miguel Basin State Bank v. Finch, 369 P.2d 544 (Cola. 1962) (small "family"
bark, acting as escrow agent was held liable for wrongful distribution of funds received. The
sspreme court, in effect, held bank for acts of its president acting within his actual and apparent
authority. Bank had clecred a debt owing to it by the wrongful distribution); Armour and Co. v.
Peterson, 371 P.2d 770 Colo. 1962) (defendant was not liable to contractor's employee for injuries
sustained when employee used defendant's machine to remove employee's tools after completion
of job, where employee knew that machine was not in good working condition and defendant had
not given employee permission to use the machine); and Berry v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 375
P.2d 93, 96 (Colo. 1962) " . . . the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against any governmental agency acting in its public capacity
. . were it otherwise, the state's servans could waive
most of her revenue."
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CORPORATIONS

A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The president of American Founders Life Insurance Company
of Denver, caused the issuance of 24,000 shares of the corporation's
common stock to three individuals in return for 58,750 shares of
Texas Adams Oil Company stock. One year after the swap, the oil
company was adjudged a bankrupt and was defunct. The 24,000
shares of American were valued at $1.60 per share, or $38,400 total.
The oil company stock was finally sold for $1,000, leaving a $37,400
deficit which was assessed by the trial court against defendants
jointly and severally, under suit brought by plaintiff, American
Founders.
The supreme court decided the president's writ of error in Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver.3' There was no
question as to the fiduciary duty owed by officers and directors of
corporations under Colorado law; the question was whether a duty
was breached.
The president caused the stock issuance. He signed the certificates knowing they were being issued in exchange for Texas
Adams; he admitted and assumed full responsibility in the minutes
of the shareholders meeting of March 12, 1957 (about the time that
Texas Adams went bankrupt). Issuance of the stock breached the
"underwriting agreement" of plaintiff with Colorado Management
Corporation, the firm which was to sell the stock for cash. The president did not bring up the transaction at any regular or special board
meeting, but did do so at an informal discussion among Colorado
Management officials, some of whom consented to waive the provisions of the underwriting agreement, provided the Texas Adams
stock was sold and converted into cash before issuance of stock in
the plaintiff corporation.
The president went ahead with the stock exchange. Eleven
months (and nine meetings of plaintiff corporation) later, he discussed the Texas Adams swap with the board of directors of plaintiff. The supreme court said:
Hudson personally caused the issuance [of stock] ...
of plaintiff corporation, not only without authority from
the board of directors but without any information being
imparted to the board . . . until eleven months after the

Texas Adams transactions had been completed. Suffice it
to say that such evidence is sufficient to establish violation
of the duties and obligations of the presidency
which also
2
carried with it management of the company'
One of the defenses was ratification of the Texas Adams transaction by plaintiff's board of directors at subsequent annual meetings of stockholders. The supreme court referred to the rule set
forth in Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life
Ins. Co., 33 to the effect that stockholders' approval of all lawful acts

does not constitute ratification of acts which the law regards as
unlawful or invalid.
In Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver,3 4 the
31 377 P.2d 391 (Colo 1962).
42 Id. at 395.
:13 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665, more fully set forth in 39 Dicta 74-75 (1962).
34 376 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1962).

1963

AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS

supreme court held that the secretary was not liable, jointly or
severally, with the president for the $37,400. While the secretary did
sign his name and affix the corporate seal on the share certificates
to the three individuals, his duties in doing so were ministerial only,
the supreme court stated, and his "performance of his duties as
secretary and his conduct as a director was not a contributing cause
of the loss sustained . . . .
A director and officer of a business corporation is
liable for his own misconduct and not for the wrongful conduct of other directors or officers unless he joined with
them in perpetrating the wrong. The directors ...

are not to

be held responsible for mere errors of judgment or for want
of prudence short of clear and gross negligence."'
B. Equitable Ownership of Stock Certificates
In Arfsten v. Higby,3 7 the supreme court decided that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act3-' does not prevent the equitable owner of
stock certificates in a corporation from bringing an action against
the corporation, where the allegation of stock ownership is necessary for the litigation. The court stated:
We construe the sections involved" ' as dealing with
legal titles, and conclude that the statute clearly recognizes
the existence of equitable or beneficial ownerships or interests in shares of stock. The Act does not purport to do
away with such ownerships or interests ....

Indeed, a con-

struction against such ownership
or interest would cast
4
doubt on the validity of the Act. '

Stock certificates of the plaintiff were never properly endorsed
by the person appearing to be the owner; there was no delivery by
that person; and no separate instrument signed by the person appearing to be the owner. The court affirms that any equitable ownership based upon those facts could not be recognized when the
rights of third parties are present who might otherwise be misled.
35 Id. at 165.
36 Id. at 165, 166.
37 372 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1962).
38 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-9-1 to -22 (1953).
39 The court stated that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-1 (1953) "Title to a certificate can be transferred
only" must be read in connection with § 31-9-21, subsections (h) andd (ii): "(h) 'Transfer' means
transfer of legal title. (i) 'Title' means legal title and does not include a merely equitable or
beneficial ownership or interest." 372 P.2d 166, 168.
4" Id. at 168, 169.
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But majority stockholders and corporate officers are not "third
parties" within the protective coverage of that term.
This was the first interpretation by the court of the effect of
the present Uniform Stock Transfer Act on equitable titles in shares
of stock, although prior decisions 41 under prior acts held
4 an enforceable status for the holder of an equitable title to stock.
PARTNERSHIPS

A. Capital Contributions
Reducing Reidel v. Brant43 to its simplest terms, we have the
following: Six weeks after formation, a partnership has a $65,000
operating loss. Following judgment by a creditor, partners A, B, and
C agree to dissolution, winding up and termination under auspices
of the court. The partnership articles provide for a 6-2-2 profit-loss
ratio. Partner A was to have supplied $60,000 as the total capital
for the business. B and C contend that A only supplied $48,000 and
that B and C are damaged to the full extent of any amounts that
might be their contribution to make up losses sustained. B and C
claim they are in no manner further obligated to partner A or the
partnership. The trial court agreed. The supreme court disagreed.
The supreme court held the evidence showed partner A had
contributed more than the total required capital of $60,000. Even if
partner A had not, the court stated in what amounts to dictum, parners B and C would still not be relieved of their duty of contribution towards the partnership losses, since there was no proof that B
and C suffered any damages by reason of A's failure to supply the
full capital.
This ruling appears equitable under the commercial maxim
"don't throw good money after bad." This dictum, however, might
afford dangerous solace to a cautious member of any partnership
who withholds needed capital. It is hoped that the court's ruling
will not be interpre t ed as a general sanction for such practice, but
merely a justifiable decision based upon particular facts.
In Thompson v. McCormick, 4 we find the unusual situation of
a plaintiff entitled to claim three million dollars without ever hav-

41 Carlton v. Cornfield, 64 Co!o. 373, 171 Pac. 1140 (1918); Weber v. Bullock, 19 Colo. 214, 75
183 (1894).
42 Other 1962 cases dealing with corporations are Colorado So. Pet. Corp. v. Stone, 369 P.2d
438 (Colo. 1962) (corporation has burden of proving corporate president violated fiduciary duty);
and Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 374 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962) (the tribe, by adopting incorporation
under 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 and consenting to sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction
within the United States, has rendered itself amenable to the courts of the State of Colorado in
any action of which the state courts may take cognizance. Reservation of the tribe is in La
Plot, and Archuleta counties, Colorado).
4: 368 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1962).
44 370 P.2d 442 (Colo. 1962).
Pac.
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ing placed one cent into partnership funds. Defendant individually
leased mining claims from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. He
then entered into an agreement which provided that plaintiff was
Mines and that plaintiff "is
to be a silent partner in McCormick
depositing . . . ten thousand dollars ' 45 to the enterprise's bank acwas
count. Profits and losses were to be shared equally. Defendant
46
to be manager and "in the eyes of the public, sole owner.
Plaintiff and defendant co-signed notes totalling $10,000 in return for cash loan to the enterprise's account. Profits of $41,000
were divided until there was a "falling-out" about a year after the
agreement was entered into. Defendant then denied that a partnership had ever existed.
Trial was to the court seven years after plaintiff's original complaint for appointment of a receiver and an accounting. The supreme court reversed the lower court's judgment for the defendant.
The main issue was whether the $10,000 deposit as a fixed capital contribution was a condition precedent to the formation of the
partnership, assuming the co-signing of notes for that amount was
not the $10,000 contemplated by defendant. The court said:
* * ' the failure by a partner to contribute his share of
capital does not necessarily negative the existence of a partnership. Such failure may be waived by the other partner,
where as here following execution of the agreement, I deI authorized and made payments of profits to plainfendant
47
tiff.

The agreement entered into, according to the court, "clearly
embodies every element necessary for the formation and creation
of a partnership, and when it was executed by the parties nothing
to be done to legally bring about a partnership
further remained
''4
relation . 8
"The intention of the parties and their interpretation of the
contract before controversy arises is one of the best indications of
their true intent."4 ' Once a partnership is found to exist, the fact
one partner has failed to make the required capital contribution "is
no reason to impose a forfeiture when the contribution can be deducted from his share of the profits.""'
Defendant also contended that the partnership was void as
against public policy because the Atomic Energy Commission leases
to individuals only. But the supreme court agreed that so long as
defendant was the sole operator of the lease and the partners only
divided the proceeds, there was no violation of the government
lease.5
45 Id. at 443.
46 Ibid.

47 Id. at 446.
48 Id. at 445.
41) Id. at 445, 446.

50 Id. at 446.
5 1 For another

case construing

Bear v. Bear, 377 P.2d 538 (Colo.

government

1962).

mineral

leases

where

a

partnership

The case deals with rights under

ment and also affirms the rule that partnership business partly
owned by one partner does not make it partnership property.

carried

One case on joint adventure is Garrett v. Kimbrel, 376 P.2d 376 (Colo.

is

involved,

see

a survivorship agree-

on upon

1962).

the

surface

land

Whether parties

are engaged in joint adventure is question of fact to be determined from facts and circumstances
but it is sufin evidence, and it is not necessary that there be shown specific, formal agreement,

ficient if it be shown by parties' conduct and other factors from which it is made to appear that
relalonship in fact was entered into. Acts and conduct of parties in furtherance of their purposes
to form

joint adventure may

speak above their expressed

declaraions to contrary.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By

MORTON GITELMAN*

One function of the highest appellate court, be it state or federal, is to resolve with some degree of finality those troublesome
questions created by societal progress. By substituting an appellate
court for some other method of resolving the issues that beset a
society, in opposition to a legislative, executive, or administrative
solution, at least two things are accomplished - some meaning is
given to the concept of "rule of law" and the high courts are constantly exposed to a barrage of criticism.
Any state court of last resort which undertakes to rule on a
question having political overtones or a question presenting a dramatic and divisive constitutional issue is bound to suffer the slings
and arrows of public criticism. Recalling the observation of an
English reporter, "At the first sound of a new argument over the
United States Constitution and its interpretation the hearts of
Americans leap with a fearful joy. The blood stirs powerfully in
their veins and a new lustre brightens their eyes. Like King Harry's
men before Harfleur, they stand like greyhounds in the slips, straining upon the start."'
The United States Supreme Court has, over the years, developed
a resilient skin, relatively impervious to missiles fired by the public.
The Colorado Supreme Court and other state courts are, in contrast,
much more vulnerable to public criticism. Consequently, constitutional issues may, at times, be approached with reluctance, or trepidation, or misgiving. Thus, in the broad view, little consistency can
be seen in2 the Colorado court's approach to similar constitutional
problems.
The Colorado Supreme Court has had, in the context of the above
discussion, a difficult year. In four cases the court was faced with
constitutional problems, the resolution of which inevitably created
public criticism. Rather than rake up old editorial coals, the following discussion of the four "big" cases in 1962 will review the court's
approach and method. Some of the other important or interesting
cases will be discussed in the second part of this review and the
minor constitutional law cases will be summarized in Part III.
I.
The four most publicized constitutional law
Colorado court in 1962 dealt with the diverse and
of raising funds for metropolitan improvements,3
portionment, 4 non-discrimination in employment, 5

decisions of the
serious problems
legislative reapand non-discrim-

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 The Economist, May 10, 1952, p. 370. Quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Steel Seizure
case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952).
2 For example, compare the court's approach in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Continental Air Lines, Inc., 368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962) with Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Case, 380 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1962). Both cases will be discussed, infra.
3 Four-County Metro. Capital Imp. Dist. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 369 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1962).
4 In re Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962).
5 Colorado Anti-Discriminotion Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962).
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ination in housing." The members of the court,
understandably,
7
were not in agreement in any one of the cases.
A. Metropolitan Improvements
Early in 1962 the Colorado court was faced with the problem of
determining the validity of a legislative scheme for providing metropolitan capital improvements through a sales and use tax imposed
throughout a metropolitan district (MCID).8 The statute involved
in the case was a legislative attempt to solve the problem, relatively
new in Colorado, created by metropolitan growth.!) Briefly, the
problem centers about the accommodation of the interests of a city,
legally limited by its boundaries, with the interests of people located in surrounding governmental units, physically indistinguishable from the city.
As a metropolitan area grows in size, capital improvements
within the city limits tend to inure to the benefit of suburban residents as well as to the inhabitants of the city. For example, a city
government may feel impelled to relieve traffic congestion caused
by "rush hour" travels of suburbanites oscillating between jobs in
the city and homes outside the city. Thus, a street-widening project
may benefit the suburban travelers more than city residents living
in an opposite corner of the city. As the costs of such improvements
increase and the amount of available revenue decreases (due in
part to the exodus of middle and upper class families to the suburbs) the financing of capital improvements within the city inevitably grows more difficult.
In one sense, the difficulties alluded to above are due to the
highly artificial and usually anachronistic legal lines drawn about
cities. One side effect of increased urbanization is the unnecessary
duplication of governmental units; because of an invisible legal line
drawn down the center of a street, people require two police departments, two fire departments, two sanitation departments, two
school districts, two city governments. These governmental services
are constantly costing more, local taxes are increasing, and, anomalously, the need for such services is decreasing in the sense of wasteful metropolitan duplication, triplication, or even great multiplication.
In essence, then, the problem posed by the MCID case was
whether the state legislature could constitutionally provide a
method for multi-government participation in local capital improvements. The legislative purpose, as reflected in Section 1 of
the act is particularly illuminating:
• . . The general assembly hereby finds . . . that local
governmental units within the metropolitan areas of this
state have common problems and needs which transcend
6 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 380 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1962).
7 In the four cases, a total of fifteen opinions were reported.
In the Metropolitan Capitol
Improvement District case, note 3, supra, Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion, Justice Sutton
concurred specially and Justice McWilliams dissented; Justice Moore also wrote on opinion on the
petition for rehearing. In the Reapportionment case, note 4, supra, Chief Justice Day wrote the
majority opinion, Justice Sutton concurred specially, Justice Moore dissented (joined by Justice
Frantz) and Justice Hall dissented. In the Continental Air Lines case, note 5, supra, Justice Moore
wrote the majority opinion, Justice Frantz dissented (joined by Justice McWilliams) and Justice
Pringle dissented. In the Case case. note 6, supra, Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion, Justice
Frantz concurred specially, Justice Pringle concurred specially and Justice Hall dissented.
8 Note 3, supra.
9 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179.
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the boundaries of such local governmental units; that as
metropolitan areas become urbanized the need for capital
improvements increases at an accelerated rate; that modern
means of communication and transportation and the attendant mobility of population have transformed metropolitan areas into homogeneous areas in which ease of movement is an absolute necessity and in which capital improvements must be geared to the needs of the entire area; that
capital improvements in any part of a metropolitan area
inure to the benefit of the entire area, as well as to the people of the state; and that there is need for coordination of
overall planning, financing and construction of capital im-
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provements and for the acquisition of capital equipment in
order to enable local governmental units to cope with the
problems of urbanization and to provide the means by
which the planning, acquisition, construction and financing
thereof may be accomplished. To these ends the provisions
of this act shall be liberally construed. 10
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the act was unconstitutional in that the state legislature did not have the power to delegate the authority to do the things set forth in the act. The unlawful
powers delegated by the legislature to the administering agency
were held to be the power to levy and collect a sales and use tax
throughout the established multi-county district,1 ' the power to
decide which proposed capital improvement projects should be carried out,"' and the power to vest title to the completed projects in
the various participating governmental units.1"
The court viewed the statutory district as an unconstitutional
interference with the powers allocated to local governments by
article XX of the Colorado Constitution. One feature of the statutory provisions that irritated the court especially was the "conduit"
nature of the district:
It is indisputably clear that the district is a conduit through
which to channel taxes earmarked for local "capital improvement" or "capital equipment" in the county or city
areas where collected ....
Indisputably the district becomes
a conduit, created by statute, through which activity is
channelled to accomplish objectives which for generations
have been achieved by local officers directly responsible to
the people, and upon whom the duty of discharging such
local responsibilities has heretofore been placed by constitutional provision
or municipal home rule charter provi14
sion, or both.
Unfortunately, the court never tells us why a "conduit" is such a
venal legislative device. The approbative connotation is even less
understandable when one realizes that almost every administrative
agency, state or federal, serves as a "conduit."
Specifically, the court felt that the district was created and
authorized to accomplish objectives which article XX of the constitution placed in the sole jurisdiction of home rule cities. Article XX
states in part that the City and County of Denver has the power
...within or without its territorial limits, to construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct and operate, water works, light plants, power
plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any
other public utilities or works or ways local in use or extent, in whole or in part, and everything required therefor,
for the use of said city and county and the inhabitants
thereof .... 5
The court reasoned that since article XX gave home rule cities
all the powers necessary in regard to capital improvements, the
10 Ibid.
Colo.
'Colo.

11
1
13
14
15

Sess. Laws
Sess. Laws
Colo. Sess. Lows
Note 8, supro at
Colo. Const. art.

1961,
1961,
1961,
71.
XX, §

ch. 179,
14 at 552.
ch. 179, § 13(5) at 551.
ch. 179, § 19 at 555.
1.
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legislature had no powers left to delegate. 16 To substantiate this
reasoning the court pointed to the advertised plans of the district
for Denver capital improvements which included branch libraries,
street widening, parks, swimming pools, boating facilities, a fire
station and maintenance equipment. 17 These activities fall within
the realm of "official functions of home rule cities with relation to
local and municipal affairs,"' ' and, therefore, can be exercised only
by home rule cities.
One difficulty with this reasoning is simply that although each
home rule city within a metropolitan area has the power under
article XX to provide for its own "capital improvement" needs, it
may not have the means to do so in the absence of some supramunicipal method of financing, such as an area-wide sales and use
tax. The point which the court never really comes to grips with is:
What is so invidious about multi-municipal cooperation to solve
metropolitan problems? This is the heart of the matter.
Perhaps the answer to the above question can be found in the
method provided by the legislature for creating and running the
district. The creation of a district was conditioned upon a petition"
filed in a district court,'2 a judicial hearing and findings 21 and a
judicially ordered and controlled election. 2 If a majority of the
votes cast were in favor of creating the district, the district was
authorized by a district court decree. 2 3 Looking at what actually
occurred in the Denver area, one can readily discern the flaw in the
act-in each of the counties surrounding Denver the voters rejected
the district but enough voters in Denver cast affirmative ballots,
thus authorizing the district by a majority of the total votes cast. 4
In addition, the act provided that the Board of Directors of the dis-5
trict could contain, up to one half of the board, Denver directors."
Obviously, the court could have invalidated the act on the basis
that, mechanically, it allowed a large city, such as Denver, to cause
the creation of a district without the approval of the suburban citizenry. If the act had contained safeguards against such a possibility,
e.g., requiring approval of a majority of the voters in each county
of the proposed district, one would be hard pressed to find any
justification for the court's decision. In other words, the court
should have based its decision upon the last mentioned grounds
rather than upon article XX prohibiting the legislative delegation
of power. If the court had followed this suggestion, it would not
have gotten into the question of special improvement districts.
When the decision was first announced many people were concerned that the court was impliedly disapproving of all types of
16" . . . it has been made perfectly clear that when the people adopted Article XX they
conferred every power theretofore possessed by the legislature to authorize municipalities to
function in local and municipal affairs . . . . In the area of providing local 'capital improvements'
and 'capital equipment' in the cities, the General Assembly had nothing to give in the way of
power or authority to any new superstructure of government encompassing multiple counties and
numerous towns and cities." Note 8, supra at 72 (emphasis in original).
17 Id. at 73.
18 Ibid.
19 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § ,5 at 546.
20 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § 6 at 546.
21 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, 4§ 7, 8, 9 at 546.
22 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179,
10 at 547.
23 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § 11 at 548
24 The court, interestingly enough, took judicial notice of these occurrences but hardly emphosized
them. Note 8, supra at 70.
25 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § 12(3) at 549.
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multi-governmental special improvement districts such as water,
sewage, and sanitation districts. On the petition for rehearing, the
court explained that "improvement districts" were still valid and
distinguished metropolitan capital improvement districts:
In matters which are not local and municipal and are
particular projects which cannot be handled by the immediate area in which the physical installation is located ....
or where water conservation will benefit a large area ....
or where cooperative effort between areas extending beyond municipal or county lines is essential with references
to a particular project in sanitation affecting the public
area, an "improvement district" is perhealth of the entire
6
fectly proper.2

In distinguishing the two kinds of districts, several factors were
emphasized:
1. Valid "improvement districts" finance improvements by a
mill levy on real property to be benefited by the improvement rather than a sales tax.
2. After completion of the capital improvement project, title
was to be conveyed to the local unit involved, rather than
being retained and managed by the district.
3. Qualifications of the directors under the statute were designed to protect certain local rather than district-wide interests.
4. The district would be authorized to acquire personal property.
Justice McWilliams, in his dissenting opinion, could see no difference between the metropolitan capital improvement district and
other improvement districts. His opinion is based heavily upon the
case approving27the improvement district created to construct the
Moffat Tunnel.
By choosing to ground its decision upon article XX of the Colorado constitution, the court is using a provision intended to grant
powers to municipalities for the purpose of restricting the legislature's power to provide solutions for metropolitan problems. If
municipalities can cooperate and do together what each could do
apart,28 and if the legislature can create a supra-municipal improve'
ment district which taxes real property located within the district, 2
then the MCID decision is explainable, not because of the limitations of article XX, but because the statutory method provided for
creating and managing the proposed district smacks of allowing
large cities to initiate a district against the will of suburbanites.
Although the only precedent value of the MCID case is to perhaps create a brake on legislative zeal, 3 the court's result might
have been more palatable to the dissenting portion of the public had
it been based upon the invalidity of the particular statute rather
than upon a holding that the legislature has no power to deal with
anything that judicial interpretation might place within the ambit
of article XX.
26 Note 8, supra at 77.
27 Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 Pac. 649 (1922).
28 See McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 37.04.
29 See note 27, supra.
3It0The court does not purport to lay down any general principles in the sense
indeed the case may be viewed by attorneys as being limited to its peculiar facts.

of precedent;
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B. Legislative Reapportionment
In March, 1962, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Baker v. Carr,31 holding that malapportionment of a state
legislature which denies some voters equal protection of the laws
gives rise to a justiciable controversy open to judicial consideration.
This decision literally "opened the floodgates." By August, 1962,
four states had been reapportioned and court actions or legislative
action was pending in twenty-five other states.3 2- In February, 1963,
it was reported that "Lawsuits [on reapportionment] have been
filed in at least 35 states, and in 18 states there have been judicial
decisions holding the33 existing legislative apportionment of one or
both houses invalid."
Soon after Baker v. Carr removed the bar of "nonjusticiable
political question" from reapportionment suits, 3 4 an original proceeding was filed in the Colorado Supreme Court seeking a writ
requiring the General Assembly to reapportion. 35 The suit was directed at the Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, and the General Assembly. The petition sought the following relief: 1. An
order requiring the Governor to call the legislature into special
session for purposes of reapportionment; 2. An order enjoining the
Secretary of State from carrying out an election under the allegedly
invalid apportionment act; 3. An order enjoining the Treasurer
from paying legislators salaries under the existing apportionment
act; and 4. An order requiring the General Assembly to reapportion.
The first action taken by the Colorado court was to discharge
the rule against the Governor, Secretary of State, and Treasurer.
The court said ". . . we cannot and will not command the Governor
to do anything, the doing of which lies within his sound discretion,
and we deem his authority to call the Legislature into special session to be such prerogative. ' 36 This aspect of the decision is hardly
startling and is entirely consistent with constitutional history.3 7 As
31 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
32 N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1962, § E, p. 5.
33 Jewell, Reapportionment and the Courts, The New Republic, Feb. 2, 1963, p. 17.
34 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Also see Part IV of the majority opinion in
Baker v. Carr, note 31, supra.
:l5In re Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962).
-16 Id. at 67. The court cited Veto Power, etc., 9 Colo. 642, 21 Pac. 477 (1886), a per curiam
decision stating, inter alia,"Whether or not an occasion exists of such extraordinary character as
demands a convention of the general assembly in special session . . . is a matter resting entirely
in the iudgment of the executive."
:37 See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 437 (1866); 2 Warren, The Supreme Court
in United States History 462 (Rev. ed. 1928).
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to the other executive officers, the court held their duties to be be-yond the court's reach in so far as the duties involved are imposed
on the officers
by the constitution or not given to them by the con38
stitution.
Turning next to the question of jurisdiction. over the subject
matter, the court felt bound by Baker v. Carr and quoted approvingly from a recent New Jersey reapportionment case:
If by reason of passage of time and changing conditions the
reapportionment statute no longer serves its original purpose of securing to the voter the full constitutional value
of his franchise, and the legislative branch fails to take appropriate restorative action, the doors of the courts must be
open to him. 9
The court then proceeded to dispose of the petition by the
amazing feat of interpreting the state constitution so as to find the
1963 General Assembly "the session next following" the 1960 United
States census. The constitution provides that the general assembly
shall revise the apportionment "at the session next following an
enumeration made by the authority of the United States.

' 40

A "rea-

sonable interpretation"'" of this provision results in the following
analysis:
1. The 1961 General Assembly was not the session next following the 1960 census because the session was "for all practical
purposes" over by the time the official certification of the
enumeration was available.
2. The 1961 extraordinary session can not be counted because
it was called "especially to correct some school finance legislation."
3. The 1962 General Assembly does not count because there
were no even-numbered annual sessions at the time article
V, § 45, was embodied in the constitution and, further, because even-year sessions are limited to fiscal matters and
subjects designated by the Governor.
4. Therefore, the 1963 General Assembly is the session next
following the 1960 enumeration! "We hold that we can
and
' '4
must await the action of the 44th General Assembly.

2

Two reasons are apparent to explain the court's reluctance to
grant relief. First, the necessary remedy, ordering the 1962 elections
to be held at large, seemed unworkable to the court and perhaps
more mischievous than another year or two of malapportionment.
Second, at the time the petition was filed, several proposals for constitutional amendments were being aired, 44: and the court felt it
should not act until both the legislature and the people have failed
to reapportion:
We believe there should be no judicial intrusion into the
legislative and executive affairs of the state, and we should
38 Note 35, supra at 67.
39Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 11, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
40 Colo. Const. art.

V, § 45.

41 Note 35, supra at 69. Why did the court refuse to interpret art. XX of the constitution
"reasonably" in the MCID case?
42 Id. at 70.
43 Two amendments appeared on the November, 1962, election ballot and Amendment 7, the
so-called Federal Plan, was adopted by the voters. The constitutionality of this amendment was
litigated before a three-judge federal court and the validity upheld in a 2-1 decision.
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be ever mindful of the necessity of preserving the integrity
and independence of the coordinate branches of government. We should, therefore, exercise an appropriate degree
of restraint to see if they will carry out their duties. Only
if both they and the people fail to act will it become a judi44
cial function to step into the void.
As a result, article V, § 45, of the constitution now requires the
general assembly to reapportion at some session after the United
States census with such duty becoming mandatory only after the
people have failed to invoke the initiative and referendum powers.
Finally, the court entered an order retaining jurisdiction "until
either a constiutional amendment has been passed by the voters in
November, 1962, or until the 44th General Assembly in its 1963 session has had an opportunity to act in the matter ....-45 This retention of jurisdiction has presumably expired of its own terms because of the constitutional amendment adopted in November, 1962.
Justice Moore dissented, urging:
In the case before us the petitioner is entitled to equal protection of the law-NOW! .... That which deprives a citizen of this "equal protection" must be swept aside and held
for naught, even though it be an act of the general assem46
bly or a provision of the state constitution!
Justice Moore felt the proper remedy to be an at-large election.
Justice Hall also dissented, disagreeing with both the majority
and Justice Moore, on the ground that the judiciary had no power
to grant appropriate relief in malapportionment cases:
The powers and duties of the Supreme Court are limited,
well defined by the Constitution and enabling legislation.
I find nothing therein remotely suggesting that this court
has the power to step in and fill the breach occasioned by
the failure of the executive or legislative branches of the
government to perform their constitutional duties.4 7
Justice Hall would have dismissed the petition with no retention
of jurisdiction.
A similar suit, seeking an injunction to enjoin enforcement of
the offensive apportionment statutes, was pending in the federal
courts at the time of the Colorado Supreme Court suit discussed
above. The three-judge federal court also withheld judgment pending the 1962 elections and retained jurisdiction until after the election, ordering a pre-trial conference "on or about November 15,
1962.1148

C. Discrimination in Employment
The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 19571) makes it an
unfair employment practice "For an employer to refuse to hire, to
discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of
44 Note 35, supra at 71.
45 Id. at 72.
46 Id. at 76-77. Compare Justice Moore's language in the MCID case: "Any who seek to persuade
this court to emasculate this constitutional provision [art. XX] by judicial fiat, are doomed to disappointment. To nullify constitutional safeguards for the sake of expediency in solving local problems of Home Rule Cities . . . would establish a precedent contrary to all precepts of constitutional
government .....
" Four-County Metro. Capital Imp. Dist, v. Board of County Comm'rs, 369 P.2d
67, 77 (Colo. 1962).
47 Note 35, supra at 83.
48 Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo. 1962).
49 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 80-24-1 to -8 (Supp. 1960).
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compensation against any person otherwise qualified, because of
race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry."5 After a hearing,
the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission found that Continental Air Lines had violated the act by denying employment to an
otherwise qualified Negro applicant for a job as airline pilot. Continental sought judicial review. 5' The district court, Judge Black,
held that the act could not be constitutionally applied to Continental because of its position as an interstate air carrier, and that application of the act would constitute a burden on interstate commerce.5
The commission and complainant sought reversal of the district
court judgment by writ of error in the Colorado
Supreme Court.
53
The supreme court affirmed the district court.
In reaching the conclusion that the Colorado Act could not be
applied to an interstate air carrier, the court relied on three United
v. Board of Wardens,54 Hall v.
States Supreme Court cases, Cooley
5
DeCuir,5 and Morgan v. Virginia. 6

The Cooley case established the broad proposition that states
are prohibited, under the commerce clause, from regulating those
areas of interstate commerce which by their nature require uniform
treatment. The Hall and Morgan cases apply that principle in situations of racial discrimination by interstate carriers.
In Hall, a Louisiana statute prohibited discrimination in passenger accommodations and a Mississippi statute required segregation. The defendant, owner of a steamship plying between the two
states, was sued for denying a Negro equal accommodations. The
Supreme Court held the Louisiana statute invalid:
Uniformity in the regulations by which he [the interstate
carrier] is to be governed from one end to the other of his
route is a necessity in his business, and to secure it Congress, which is untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative
power of determining
57
what such regulations shall be.

In the Morgan case, a Virginia statute requiring segregation on
all passenger motor vehicles was held unconstitutional when challenged by an interstate passenger. The test was stated thusly:
There is a recognized abstract principle . . . that may be

taken as a postulate for testing whether particular state
legislation in the absence of action by Congress is beyond
state power. This is that the state legislation is invalid if
it unduly burdens that commerce in matters where uniformity is necessary-necessary in the constitutional sense
of useful in accomplishing a permitted purpose. Where uniformity is essential for the functioning of commerce, a state
may not interpose its local regulation. 58
50 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-24-6(2) (Supp. 1960).
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-24-8(1) (Supp. 1960): "Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be
aggrieved by a final order of the commission, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain
judicial review thereof ....
"
52 Continental Air Lines v. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, Denver Dist. Ct., B-29648,
Jan. 7, 1961.
53 Colorado Anti-Discrim. Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962).
54 53 U.S. (12 How.) 996 (1851).
55 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
56 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
57 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 547, 548 (1877).
58 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946).
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Applying these authorities to the case at bar, the Colorado court
concluded that the state was powerless to legislate concerning racial
discrimination by employers engaged in interstate commerce: "The
Supreme Court of the United States has clearly indicated that with
reference to interstate carriers the regulation of racial discrimination is a matter in which there is a 'need for national uniformity,'
and that the states are without jurisdiction to act in that area." 59
Justice Frantz dissented in a lengthy, well-documented opinion.
In essence, the most persuasive reasons for his dissent were the
ideas that employment contracts are not commerce and can thus
be regulated by the states under their police power, and that state
anti-discrimination statutes aid rather than burden commerce in
fulfilling the requirements of the 14th amendment.
Justice Pringle wrote a separate dissent, which can be summed
up in the following extract:
• . .I cannot believe that a law passed by a state which
implements a basic concept of our form of governmentthe right of a man, otherwise well qualified, not to be
denied a job solely because of his race, color or creed-can
60
be deemed to be a burden on interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on October
8, 1962,61 and on April 22, 1963, handed down a.unanimous opinion
reversing the Colorado court.6 2 Mr. Justice Black wrote for the
Court and held, in effect, that the Colorado court had misread the
Hall and Morgan cases. Those cases are distinguisable upon the
theory that they involved situations where the interstate carriers
were exposed to inconsistent legislation in different states; the burden on interstate commerce arose out of the hazard of conflicting
state treatment.o3 In the instant case, however, the Court felt that
enforcement of Colorado's anti-discrimination act would not expose,
and indeed could not expose, Continental to conflicting statutes in
other states; in other words, no other state could compel the employer to behave contrary to the order issued by the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Commission. Therefore, reasoned the Court, this is
59 Note 53, supro at 974-75.
60 Id. at 982 (emphasis in original).
61 Colorado Anti-Discritn. Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 83 S.Ct. 26 (1962).
62 Colorado Anti-Discrim. Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 83 S.Ct. 1022 (1963).
63 This is the approach taken in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), where the
Court held that a new safety device (contour mud-flaps on large trucks) out of line with the requirements imposed by other states (which required straight mud-flaps) may place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
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not a case requiring uniformity among states in the sense of Cooley,
Hall and Morgan.
D. Discrimination in Housing
The Colorado Fair Housing Act of 195964 makes it unlawful
For any person having the right of ownership, or possession, or the right of transfer, rental, or lease of any housing: 6 5 To refuse to transfer, rent, or lease, or otherwise to
deny or to withhold from any person or persons such housing because of race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or
ancestry; to discriminate against any person because of
race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry in the
terms, conditions, or privileges pertaining to any housing,
or the transfer, rental, or lease thereof, or in the furnishing
of facilities or services in connection therewith; to cause to
be made any written or oral inquiry or record concerning
the race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry of a
person seeking to purchase, rent, or lease any housing.6 6
The validity of this and other provisions of the fair housing act
into question in Colorado Anti-DiscriminationComm'n
were called
67
v. Case.

In the Case case, a Negro couple answered a newspaper advertisement for sale of a home in Colorado Springs, inserted by the
owner who was a real estate broker. After visiting the property and
giving the salesman a $500 deposit, the Negroes were informed by
an employee of the broker that they would be unhappy in that
neighborhood. When the Negroes insisted on purchasing the house,
they were told it had been sold; actually the house was conveyed to
one of the broker's salesman who subsequently resold the house to
a white purchaser.
The commission found, after hearing, that an unfair housing
practice had been committed and ordered the respondent real estate
firm to offer the complainants a comparable home in the same or a
comparable neighborhood. Upon review in the district court,lis that
portion of the act authorizing the commission to enter the order it
did was held unconstitutional as being vague and indefinite and an
unlawful delegation of legislative power. 69
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. . 69-7-1 to -7 (Supp. 1960).
65 "Housing" is defined in the act to " . . . mean any building, structure, or port thereof which
is used or occupied . . . as the home or residence of one or more human beings; or any vacant
land for sale or lease; but does not include Premises maintained by the owner or lessee as the
household of his family with or 3without domestic servants and not more than four boarders or
lodgers." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7- (c) (Supp. 1960). The meaning of this definition is unclear (and
uninterpreted); apparently, it is intended to exempt from the act those property owners who rent
out rooms in their homes, so long as less than four boarders ore taken in.
66 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7-5(I)(b) (Supp. 1960). The act goes on to establish other unfair housing
practices of a similar vein in connection with financing
and advertising housing and inserting
9
restrictive covenants in real estate instruments. §§ 6 -7-5(I)(c), (d), (e), (f). Subsection (2) carves
out an exception for religious organizations which gives preferences to members of the religious
denomination. § 69-7-5(2). This subsection is obviously designed to exempt nursing homes, sanitoria,
old peoples' homes, etc., operated by religious bodies. In this connection, the provision must be
read along with § 69-7-3(b) defining "person."
67 380 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1963). The case was decided on December 17, 1962, and rehearing denied
April 8, 1963. The author felt it was more important to include the case in the 1962 review while
it is still fresh.
68 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7-7(1) (Supp. 1960). The wording of this section is exactly the same as
in note 51, supro.
69 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7-6(12) (Supp. 1960): "If, upon all of the evidence at a hearing, the
commission shall find that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair housing
practice . . . the commission shall . . . issue . . . an order requiring such respondent to cease and
desist from such unfair housing practice and to take such affirmative action, including (but not
limited to) the transfer, rental, or lease of housing; the making of reports as to the manner of
compliance and such other action as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate the purposes
of this article."
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The supreme court discussed first the validity of the fair housing act in light of the contention that the act takes property without
due process 70 and takes private property for private use in violation
of article II, § 14, of the Colorado Constitution. The court upheld
the act as a valid exercise of the police power, balancing the property rights asserted by the real estate firm with the human rights
asserted by the complainants. The court held that the ninth amendment to the United States Constitution buttressed by the Colorado
Constitution, article I, §§ 3 and 28, establish inherent and inalienable human rights superior to property rights which have never
been regarded as absolute. 1
The court bases its decision, then, on a theory of natural rights
-the right of an individual to acquire and possess property free
from racial or religious discrimination far outweighs any right,
claimed to be "inherent," of a property owner to discriminate in the
transfer of his property to anyone he sees fit. Although it is unusual
for a court to talk in terms of inherent rights, an analysis of the
two concepts, "private property" and "police power" shows that
they are often in conflict in the sense that almost every exercise of
the "police power" results in an uncompensated burden on private
property. As was so well stated so long ago by Professor Ely:
Now there is more in this police power than regulation
of property relations and contractual relations. But there
is no difficulty except where property and economic relations are concerned. No one objects to general benevolence
-to doing good without cost-so when we consider police
power, its essence is the interpretation of property, and
when we consider the real essence of the police power as
found in the leading American decisions we find that it is
consistent with this concept. It is that power of the courts
committed to them by American Constitutions whereby
they must shape property and contract to existing social
conditions by settling the question of how far social regulations may, without compensation, impose burdens on prop72
erty.
The court answered the contention that the act takes private property for private use without compensation, a taking prohibited by
article II, § 14, of the state constitution, by pointing out that the act
only comes into operation once the owner of the property, of his
own free will, places the property on the open market.
After establishing the validity of the fair housing act under the
state police power, the court turned to the problem of whether
§ 6 (12) of the act 73 amounts to an unlawful delegation of legislative
power. The court held that the portion of § 6(12) empowering the
commission to take "such other action as in the judgment of the
commission will effectuate the purposes of this article" did amount
70 In violation of the

fourteenth amendment

§ 25 of the Colorado Constitution.

to the United

States Constitution and article II,

71 The court quoted from Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934): " ...
But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest."
72 1 Ely, Property and Contract in Their Relation to the Distribution of Wealth 220 (1914)
(emphasis in original).
73 See note 69, supra.
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to an unlawful delegation: "The legislature cannot delegate to any
administrative agency 'carte blanche' authority to impose sanctions
7 4
or penalties for violation of the substantive portion of a statute.
Presumably, the result of this holding is that the commission
may order the transfer, rental or leasing of housing, but is powerless to fashion any other remedies. This holding is perhaps consonant with other Colorado cases 75 but seems out of line when
viewed in light of most modern decisions in other states, and under
federal law. More and more states today are following the federal
view of delegations to administrative agencies and holding that
such delegations are valid if intelligible standards are set forth to
guide the agency in exercising its discretion. 7 6 The Colorado legislature certainly gave the commission a standard in § 6 (12) -"such
action . .

.

as will effectuate the purposes" of the act 7"

A majority of the court, then, upheld the fair housing act in
ringing terms78 but limited the power of the Anti-Discrimination
Commission to fashion remedies appropriate to correction of unfair
housing practices. This feature of the case is perhaps the most difficult to appreciate as one so rarely sees judicial liberalism and
judicial conservatism so emphatically displayed in the same opinion.
On the one hand, the court talks in terms of "natural rights" and
ascribes to the legislature the valid and laudable purpose of saving
the nation from tyranny while, on the other hand, the court invokes
the delegation doctrine in all of its fictitious majesty and says only
the legislature can detail the remedies to be applied under the act.
Justices Frantz and Pringle concurred specially, in separate
opinions. Justice Frantz used his opinion to indicate that the fair
housing act is in line with Colorado's historical role of liberalism
in questions of race and color:
Our pronouncement this day is on the side of history.
What we have here said is in harmony with eternal principles to which the founding fathers pledged fealty in
simple, noble language in the Declaration of Independence.
For it is historical fact that Colorado's
statehood marks the
7
first fulfillment of these principles.
Justice Pringle in his concurrence indicated his belief that even
though the commission is now limited under § 6 (12) to ordering
the transfer, rental or lease of housing, an order may be entered
requiring a respondent to procure "comparable housing in the same
or in a comparable neighborhood" in those cases where there is
evidence in the record to substantiate the availability of comparable
housing.
74 Note 67, supra at 43.
75 See, e.g., Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959).
76 For an excellent discussion of the delegation problem, see Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of
Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 560 (1947).
77 Compare this language with the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 which authorized the
Administrator to establish prices which "in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and
will effectuate the purposes of this Act." This delegation was upheld in Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (19").
78 E.g., "When, as at present, the entire world is engulfed in a struggle to determine whether
the American concept of freedom with equality of opportunity shall survive . . . we would be
blind to stark realities if we should hold that the public sofety and the welfare of this notion
were not being protected by the Act in question. Indeed, whether the struggle is won or lost
might well depend upon the ability of our people to attain the objectives which the Act in question
is designed to serve." Note 67, supra at 41-42.
79 Id. at 43. Justice Frantz went on to point out that the spirit of the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments was embodied in the Enabling Act creating the State of Colorado and that
the constitution of the new state reflected this spirit.
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Justice Hall dissented, believing the entire act unconstitutional
as in direct violation of article II, § 14, of the state constitution,
"Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner." Justice Hall first pointed out that other states
with fair housing acts limit the application of the statute to publicly
assisted housing; only Massachusetts applies its statute to all housing8 ° and that state has no constitutional provision like article II,
§ 14. Then he indicated that the effect of enforcing the fair housing
act would be to divest the owner of the property of his title and
place title in the complainants. "Such a result, in my humble opi80 Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 182 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1962).
New York, on April 22, 1963, extended its statute to cover private housing, effective September 1,
1963.
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nion, would constitute a 'taking of property in a constitutional
sense' and in flagrant violation of article II, section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado." '
II.
In the four cases just discussed, the court was subjected to extensive public criticism. However, in four other constitutional law
cases the court handed down opinions on fairly important questions
with little publicity attending the pronouncements. These four cases
will be discussed here.
A. Real Estate Taxes and JudicialReview
In Mardi, Inc. v. City and County of Denver,s-2 the court invalidated a statute requiring payment of assessed property taxes as a
condition precedent to judicial challenge of the correctness of the
assessment.
The City and County of Denver assessed plaintiffs' property,
Cherry Creek Shopping Center, in 1958. The plaintiffs objected to
the assessment; after hearings, the Board of Equalization denied the
petitions for reduction in the amount of assessment. The denial was
by means of written notice dated December 31, 1958, and received
by the plaintiffs on Friday, January 2, 1959. Upon appeal to the
district court, the decision was for the defendant because of plaintiffs' failure to comply with the statutory provision," . . . before the

appeal to the district court shall be allowed, the petitioners shall
pay to the county treasurer
the amount of the tax levied pursuant
8 3
to such assessment.

The Colorado Supreme Court was, on appeal, faced with the
question of whether the above statute requires or can require payment of taxes levied under a contested assessment as a condition
precedent to the district court's jurisdiction. The supreme court
found that the requirement of § 38 is void as an "invidious and unwarranted distinction
not countenanced by constitutional require4
ments of equality.

Because another statute provides that "all taxes shall be due
and payable, one-half on or before the last day of February, and the
remainder on or before the last day of July of the year following
the one in which they were assessed," 'S the court found protesting
taxpayers are discriminated against in having to pay all the assessed
taxes prior to their district court appeal,," while non-protesters need
not pay until the end of February and July.
The courts holding-that § 38 is discriminatory and void because of no justifiable basis for the prepayment requirement-displays an unfortunate application of constitutional principles. Assuming the correctness of the result, the court, by invalidating the
statute, used a solid club rather than a flexible birch rod in achieving that result. Whether or not it is reasonable to require payment
of taxes prior to judicial challenge of the assessment, is primarily
81 Note 67, supra at 48. Justice Hall went on to say that "Winking at clear constitutional provisions and giving judicial sanction to unlimited expansion of the police powers may well be
Forerunners of a police state." Ibid.
82 375 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1962).
83 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-3-38 (1953).
84 Note 82, supro at 685.
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-9-3 (1953).
86 Protesters must appeal by the first Monday in January. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-3-38 (1953).
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a legislative question, i.e., the legislature has the power to prescribe
conditions precedent to using the courts for judicial determination
of tax problems. In the Mardi case, however, the court is using an
equal protection theory because of discrimination between two dissimilar classes-protesting and non-protesting taxpayers. This injudicious use of equal protection notions and of heavy-handed statute voiding are especially indefensible because another theory was
available to the court for achieving the same result.
The court pointed out, in the Mardi case, that the plaintiffs had
only one day in which to prepare their district court appeal because
they were notified of the rejection of their administrative appeal
on January 2, a Friday, and the statute required filing of the appeal
by the first Monday of January. This, the court said in a dictum,
"can be scarcely deemed to be due process of law, or fair."8 Thus,
the court could have decided that these plaintiffs were denied due
process, or that the statute as applied to them imposed an unconstitutional requirement, instead of abstractly deciding that the statute
is void on its face because some class other than the one utilizing
the statute is treated differently!
B. Annexations
When the City of Denver annexes territory of an adjacent county, must this annexation be approved by a majority of voters in the
entire county affected? The Colorado court, in Board of County
8
Comm'rs v. City and County of Denver,"
said such approval need
not be obtained.
The Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County
sought judicial review 9 on behalf of the residents of the county and
in their individual capacities to challenge two annexations of Jefferson County territory. The basis for the challenge was that the
provisions 0 allowing Denver to annex territory of other counties
without submitting the question to all the voters in that county
constitute a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.
The supreme court carefully analyzed the equal protection
argument 9 ' and decided first that the county commissioners in their
official capacity could not avail themselves of fourteenth amendment protection, on the theory that92"subdivisions of a state government cannot challenge state action.
The court then decided that the county commissioners, in their
individual capacities, were not denied equal protection. This part
of the decision is based on the Supreme Court case of Hunter v.
Pittsburgh)' 3 holding that citizens have no vested right, in the constitutional sense, in municipal boundaries.
The county commissioners, in this case, tried to depict the annexation provisions as allowing the City of Denver to encroach upon
the territory of surrounding counties at will, upsetting county tax
87 Note 82, supra at 683.
88 372 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1962), appeal dismissed, 82 S.Ct. 679 (1963).
89 Under the provisions of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-11-6 (1963).
90 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 1. Also see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-11-3 (1953).
91 Compare the court's approach in this case with the loose language in the Mardi case discussed
in the previous section of this article. The variation in approach is even less understandable when
one notes that the two opinions were written by the same justice.
92 The court relied on Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36 (1933), holding that a municipal corpora.
tion has no privileges and immunities under the fourteenth amendment.
93 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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planning and altering intra-county districts. This depiction was rejected by the court:
Annexations to Denver . . . are the product of the free
choice of the majority of statutorily authorized persons in
the district seeking annexation. The City Council of Denver
does not initiate the annexation proceedings; it merely accepts or rejects the annexation 94petition presented, subject
to other statutory requirements.
An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question.9"
C. Zoning
Board of County Comm'rs of Jefferson County v. Shaffer96 involved a challenge of a zoning classification resulting in a supreme
court decision which clearly sets forth the role of the judiciary in
zoning cases.
In the Shaffer case, the county zoned the plaintiffs' property
R-2, residential; petitions to change the zoning classification were
denied, and a suit was brought alleging that the zoning resolution
as applied to the plaintiffs was confiscatory, discriminating, unreasonable and, therefore, violative of the equal protection and due
process provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The trial
court granted relief and issued decrees which, inter alia, rezoned
the property in question.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its powers in substituting its judicial judgment for that of
the zoning agency. The courts cannot interfere with the discretion
vested in the zoning body except where there is a clear showing of
an abuse of that discretion and, further, where the question is
merely debatable no abuse of discretion exists. In reviewing the
instant record, the court emphasized the following principles:
1. The fact that property might be more valuable in a
commercial use than in a residential use is not sufficient
in and of itself to upset a zoning ordinance establishing
the property as residential.
2. The fact that adjoining streets are redesigned to carry
a heavy flow of traffic (thus greatly increasing the commercial value of the property and decreasing its residential value) is insufficient to establish the unreasonableness of the residential classification.
3. Unless there is a showing that the property cannot be
used for the purposes limited in the zoning ordinance,
one cannot establish an abuse of the zoning agency's discretion in denying a change of classification.
The court's decision is based on the feeling that a court is not
equipped to engage in the business of zoning and that for a court
to substitute its judgment as to the correct zoning classification of
a particular piece of property would result in more harm than good
because of the evils of spot zoning. Consequently, so long as there
94 Note 88, supra at

157.

95 82 S.Ct. 679 (1963).
96 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1962). The principles underlying this decision were reaffirmed in City
and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 374 P.2d 357 (Colo. 1962). Also see Baum v. City and
County of Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
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is some evidence to support the zoning authority's classification, it
will be upheld.
The import of this decision lies in the notice given by the court
that the only way to upset a zoning classification judicially is to
show a clear abuse of discretion. Furthermore, a showing that the
property is more valuable in another use will not satisfy the abuse
of discretion requirement so long as some evidence exists that the
property can be used for purposes consistent with the zoning
agency's classification.
D. Unemployment Compensation
In Donnell v. Industrial Comm'n,9 7 the court upheld the statute
authorizing the commission to use its discretion in denying jobless
pay for voluntary quits. The statute provides that ". . . if an individual ... has quit his job without good cause and without extenuating
circumstances, he shall be disqualified for not less than ten weeks
nor more than thirty-two and one-half weeks ... as determined by
the department in each case according to the circumstances or seriousness of the act or offense ...."98
In the Donnell case, a woman quit her job after a salary dispute
with the employer. Upon applying for benefits she was awarded
compensation with a twenty-two week disqualification. The employer appealed on the ground that the former employee was not
entitled to any benefits. The supreme court held the statute consti97 368 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1962).
98 Colo. Rev. Stat. §

82 4 9

- - (l)(c) and (d)

(Supp. 1960).
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tutional on the basis of a former decision involving the same wording in a predecessor statute.1 9
This decision was the impetus for proposed legislation in the
General Assembly to amend the statute and eliminate compensation for those who quit their jobs voluntarily. As of this writing,
no such legislation has been passed. Although unemployment compensation statutes in many states provide total disqualification for
voluntary quits, 100 good words can be said for the Colorado approach, in that the statute recognizes the difficulty of defining accurately "good cause" and "unemployed through no fault of his
own" and leaves to the department the task of assessing the degree
of "fault" which attached to the voluntary quit. 1 1
III.
Several other cases involving constitutional law issues were
decided by the court in 1962. Because of the relatively minor significance of the constitutional law decisions in these cases, they will
merely be digested here.
0
In Goldy v. Gerber,1
2 the court decided, among other things,
that the business of conducting an industrial bank could be regulated and even prohibited under the police power of the state.
McCarty v. Goldstein'03 upheld the validity of the two year statute of limitations for malpractice actions against doctors, chiropractors, osteopaths, chiropodists, midwives and dentists. The statute had been challenged as violative of equal protection because
other practitioners of healing arts, such as nurses and psychologists,
were not included. The court held that "The classification of occupations and professions for limitation and regulation is a matter for
legislative determination, and when based upon
reasonable grounds
04
will not be interfered with by the judiciary.'
In Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game and Fish Comm'n,'0 5 the
court held that a priority to use of water constitutes a property
right which is protected under the eminent domain provisions of
the state constitution.
Whether the non-exercise of a special power of appointment in
Colorado, thus passing the assets of a New York trust in accordance
with the trust, creates a taxable transfer in Colorado was decided
in People v. Cooke. 10 6 In that case, a trust was created by decedent's
mother in Connecticut in 1931, the trustee and trust assets located
in New York; decedent was designated an income beneficiary for
life with a general power of appointment. In 1949, decedent in New
Jersey reduced her general power to a special power; in 1956 decedent became domiciled in Colorado and in 1957 she executed a
will providing that it was not her intent to exercise the special
power. After decedent's death, Colorado sought to include the trust
assets in the estate for inheritance tax purposes. The executor challenged such inclusion on constitutional grounds. The Colorado court
99 Cottrell Clothing Co. v. Teets, 139 Colo. 558, 342 P.2d 1016 (1959).
100 E.g., Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act § 601 B: "An individual who has left work
voluntarily without good cause . . . shall be ineligible for benefits ....
.
101 See Teple, Disqualification: Discharge for Misconduct and Voluntary Quit, 10 Ohio St. L.J.
191 (1949); Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 Yale L.J. 147 (1945).
102377 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1962).
103 376 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962).
104 Id. at 693.
105 369 P.2d 557 (Colo. 1962).
106 370 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1962).
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held that, for tax purposes, a special power of appointment could
constitutionally be treated as a general power:
... a general power of appointment, exercised or non-exercised, is a proper foundation upon which to impose a succession tax, even though the intangible assets are located
in a state other than that where the
person possessing the
10 7
power of appointment is domiciled.
In Peters v. People,10 the court decided two constitutional law
points. First, the court held that the larceny by bailee provision of
the criminal code10 9 is not vague and indefinite in the constitutional
sense of informing men of common intelligence of its meaning and
application. 110 Second, the court stated its understanding of Mapp
v. Ohio:"'
We conclude that the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States went no farther than to exclude in the state
courts the use of evidence obtained by way of an unreasonable search and seizure as forbidden by the Fourth Amendment ....
It does not exclude all evidence which might be
obtained as an incident to a lawful arrest, nor does it preclude the admission of all evidence which may have been
obtained without the sanction of a search warrant [such as
a permissive search] .112
The court, in Bunzel v. City of Golden,"'3 upheld a city ordinance imposing a very high license fee upon "operators" of coinoperated amusement games and a relatively low license fee for
"dealers." The court held that the business of operating pinball machines is not "inherently useful or harmless" and thus may be regulated without regard to fourteenth amendment arguments. This
conclusion was based on the statute authorizing cities to prohibit
or suppress gaming devices 1 4 and a 1936 decision holding that pinball machines are gaming devices within the statute.115
In Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. State,16 the court held that
the state constitution, article IX, § § 9 and 10, gives the state board
of land commissioners the power to control public lands and this
power encompasses the granting of mineral leases without prior
approval of other state agencies.
117
Finally, in May Stores Shopping Centers, Inc. v. Shoemaker,
the court, in invalidating the method utilized to assess shopping
center property (the assessor based the determination on a comparison with a "model shopping center" located elsewhere in the
city), held that hearings before the Board of Equalization" S are
107 Id. at 899. The reason for treating a general or a special power (non-exercised) the same
is that in either case the trust beneficiaries receive their bounty by the inaction of the decedent.
Id. at 900.
108 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
109 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-14 (1953): "If any bailee, by finding or otherwise of any money,
bank bill, or note, or goods or chattels, shall convert the same to his own use with an intent to
steal the same, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny in the same manner as if the original taking
has [sic] been felonious, and on conviction thereof shall be punished accordingly."
110 See e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
111 367 U.S. 643 (1962).
112 Note 108, supra at 175.
113 372 P.2d 161 (Colo. 1962).
114 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-32-1(66) (1953).
115 Walker v. Begole, 99 Colo. 471, 63 P.2d 1224 (1936).
116 368 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1962).
117 376 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1962).
118 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-3-38 (1953).
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quasi-judicial; thus due process requires a full adversary type hearing and no use of extra-record evidence.
IV.
In attempting to summarize the work of the Colorado court in
constitutional law cases the difficult task is to find a common thread
running through the major cases. The only effective and constructive criticism lies in examining the court's approach to constitutional
cases and, unfortunately, the Colorado court's approach in 1962 was
so varied and so inconsistent that, in effect, no approach can be discerned. One expects differing approaches from different justices
but how can
one deal with very different approaches from the same
justice?'" )
One conclusion, then, is inescapable-the court and the individual justices have not developed a consistent, philosophically based
approach to constitutional problems. Rather, the methodology is
intensely casuistic. This is, perhaps, undesirable from the point of
view of the practitioner who would like to predict the outcome of
his case. However, one finds the same phenomenon operating in
connection with most state supreme courts. The reason is, in part,
due to the type of work performed by the state appellate courts.
Constitutional problems are only one part, and a small one at that,
of the workload of the Colorado court. Thus the court does not have
the opportunity to develop an approach to constitutional problems
as does the United States Supreme Court.
The question thus becomes whether one can expect the justices
to do more than react to the immediate issues before them. Perhaps
the only practical way to answer the question is to express a hope
that the members of the court will more carefully consider the language of their opinions in light of what they
have expressed in
20
prior opinions involving constitutional issues.1
-

119 See notes 2, 41, 46, 91, supro, and accompanying text.
120 This comment is in no way intended to reflect upon the results reached
only upon the methods and language used in arriving at those results.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By

VANCE

R.

DITTMAN, JR.*

During 1962 the Supreme Court of Colorado rendered decisions
which involved several significant interpretations of the rules of
evidence. This review will attempt an analysis of these cases in the
respective categories involved. Consistent with the intent of this
one year review, no reference will be made to cases applying rules
of evidence in orthodox fashion to the frequently recurring situation presented by the ordinary trial. Rather, the cases selected
for discussion are those which appear to decide a novel question
before this court.
The use of demonstrative evidence came in for the usual objections that it is too inflammatory and prejudicial, but in each
instance the supreme court found that the evidence served a legitimate purpose and that its use was proper.
In Wooley v. People,' objection was made to the admission of
certain photographs of the body of Wooley's alleged victim, and
also to a photograph of Wooley in the act of demonstrating to the
police officers exactly how he had committed the crime. Wooley
had made this demonstration following his confession, but at the
trial he contended that the shooting was accidental. The photograph
indicated that the shooting was intentional.
As to the admission of the photographs of the body, it showed
two things which were essential to the prosecution's case. The
first was the wound in the head, which was the handiwork of
Wooley; the other, the state of decomposition which resulted from
Wooley's attempt to conceal the body. The photographs corroborated
both Wooley's confession and other testimony as to the nature of
the wound and of the disposition of the body. Obviously the photographs brought vividly before the jury the details of the crime. But
the court held that the photographs were admissible, being "competent evidence of anything which it is competent for a witness
to describe in words,"2 and that their shocking nature would not
make necessary their exclusion, since they disclosed only conditions
which were the direct result of Wooley's action and which were
relevant to the issue in the case.
As to the photograph of Wooley's demonstration to the officers,
the court pointed out that since there was no suggestion that an eye
witness could not relate what he had seen Wooley do in the demonstration, the photograph not only corroborated what such eye
witnesses had said, but also gave meaning to the demonstration.
There was no error, therefore, in receiving the photograph in
evidence. This was particularly true since the photograph indicated
an intentional act, whereas the testimony offered on behalf of
Wooley indicated that it was accidental.
This case clarifies considerably the role which demonstrative
evidence may play in substantiating verbal testimony, even though
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1962).
2 Id. at 907.
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such evidence may portray the facts much more vividly than might
be necessary to establish the existence of such facts. The evidence
is not to be excluded merely because the situation shown might be
established by words alone.
This aspect of the law as to demonstrative evidence was developed still further by the supreme court in the case of People v.
Spinuzzi.3 This was a writ of error pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §
39-7-27 (1953) on behalf of the people for a review of a decision of
the trial court on questions of law. Testimony at the trial was to
the effect that the deceased fell, with defendant on top of him;
that defendant had a gun in his hand; that deceased was holding
his hand in front of his face; that death was caused by a bullet in
deceased's brain; that a shot was fired at that time and that there
was no other shot fired on the occasion and, finally, that the
bullet which lodged in deceased's brain and caused his death had
passed through the palm of deceased's hand, and that this hand
bore powder burns where the bullet entered. During the prosecution's case the district attorney offered in evidence a photograph
of deceased's body to establish his identify and also to show the
bullet hole in the hand and in the skull, as well as to illustrate the
path which the bullet took, but the trial court restricted the use of
the photograph to the question of identity. This was held to be
error, since it has been consistently held, in Color-ado, "that photographs are competent evidence of anything which it is competent
for a witness to describe in words."'4 The court held that the prosecution was entitled to have the jury observe the picture as a portrayal of the bullet wounds, even though they had already been
described by the testimony of witnesses.
The rule as to the use of demonstrative evidence was succinctly
stated by the court in Jensen v. South Adams County Water and
San. Dist.,5 as follows: "Where the only purpose of a photograph is
to inflame the jury, the pictures should be excluded. But where, as
here, they portray the injury caused by the accident, they may not
be excluded on the sole ground6 that they have 'emotional overtones' or will be embarrassing.
A frequently recurring problem arises as to the admissibility of
evidence of separate and distinct offenses of a similar nature to
that of the offense which is involved in the trial, where such evidence is offered to prove the existence of an intent, plan, scheme,
or to establish identity. In Wooley v. People.7 a variation on this
rather common situation arose. To prove a motive for the felonious
killing, the prosecution offered evidence of another but completely
dissimilar offense. This evidence related to Wooley's cashing of a
number of checks payable to the victim of the homicide and delivered to his residence after his death. Wooley succeeded in cashing
these checks by devious means, including forgery, and realized
about $1400 from them. The court held that the usual rule as to the
admissibility of evidence of other similar offenses did not apply
to this situation, but that this evidence was admissible as an intet 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
4 Id. at 431.
5 368 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1962).
6 Id. at 212.
7 Note I supro.
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gral part of the total picture surrounding the homicide, to establish
the motive for the offense-to kill the victim for profit.
In connection with the use of evidence of separate offenses the
court decided a question of first impression in this state in Bizup v.
People.8 Here the defendant contended that evidence of the separate
but related offenses was inadmissible because he had confessed to
them and that the only purpose of introducing the evidence was
to prejudice the jury by making the killing appear more heinous.
The court rejected this contention with the comment that "an
admission by a defendant does not prevent the state from presenting separate and independent proof of the fact admitted."9
What appears to be a question of first impression in Colorado
was involved in Jordan v. People.'0 Here a statement made by
the defendant had been reduced to writing but the defendant had
refused to either read it or sign it, so its admission as a confession
was denied. After establishing its admissibility by showing the
basic facts required to make the statement admissible as a past
recollection recorded, however, the statement was read to the jury,
in its entirety. To this procedure the defendant objected because,
he insisted, the witness must first be shown the writing and must
state that it does not revive his recollection, before the writing
may be read to the jury. The witness was not asked, and he did
not state, whether the document revived his present recollection.
The court disapproved any rule which requires that the absence
of a present recollection must be shown as a preliminary to the
introduction of past recollection recorded, and relied upon a s t ate-ment by Professor Wigmore, which, in pertinent part, is as follows:
Is the use of past recollection necessary (1) because in the
case in hand there is not available a present actual recollection in the specific witness, or (2) because in the usual case
a faithful record of past recollection, if it exists, is more
trustworthy and desirable than a present recollection of
greater or less vividness?
The latter view, it would seem, is more in harmony
with general experience, as well as with the attitude of the
judges who early vindicated the use of past recollection. A
faithful memorandum is acceptable, not conditionally on
the total or partial absence of a present remnant of actual
recollection in the particular witness, but unconditionally;
because, for every moment of time which elapses between
the act of recording and the occasion of testifying, the actual recollection must be inferior in vividness to the recollection perpetuated in the record."
The court added that testimony of admissions of the accused
should be accurate and that the exact words contained in the
writing would obviously be more reliable. The court then enunciated the general rule applicable to such situations in the
following words: "We are persuaded that the admissibility of a
past recollection recorded does not depend upon the absence of
8
9
10
It

371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 789.
376 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962).
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 738 (3d ed. 1940).
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a present recollection.' 2 This rule makes admissible the authenticated writing, in the first instance, whether the situation is one
in which the witness would be likely to have an independent recollection or not and this becomes a matter of irrelevant inquiry.
For the first time the supreme court had occasion to consider
the reach of the extremely important decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio.13 It was urged by the defendant,
in Peters v. People,1 4 that certain evidence admitted against the
accused had been secured in violation of the safeguards set up in
Mapp. A motion in the trial court that the accused be permitted to
offer testimony to show the circumstances connected with the
search and seizure was denied. The accused argued that this constituted reversible error.
Unfortunately for the enlightenment of the bar, the court
determined that the evidence clearly indicated a permissive searcb
and that there was nothing whatever in the record to indicate an
unreasonable search and seizure, within the proscription of Mapp.
The only indication of the attitude which may be adopted by the
court as to a definition of "unreasonable" is to be found in certain
language, which is clearly dictum, as follows:
We conclude that the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States went no further than to exclude in the
state courts the use of evidence obtained by way of an unreasonable search and seizure as forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. It does not
exclude all evidence which might be obtained as an incident to a lawful arrest, nor does it preclude the admission
of all evidence which may have been obtained without the
sanction of a search warrant. 1'5
The court was not required to answer the much debated question as to whether the state court may set up its own standards of
reasonableness, or whether the state is bound to follow the same
standards established by the federal courts in proceedings in those
courts. This answer must be forthcoming in another case at another
day and only the Supreme Court of the United States can finally
resolve the question.
12 Note 10 supra ot 703.
13 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
15 Id.at 175.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By WILLIAM H.
and CHARLES F.

ERICKSON*
BREGA**

The law of torts in Colorado did not suffer any radical change
in 1962. The decisions of the supreme court interpreting the tort law
of Colorado were largely confined to clarification of existing principles. Established statutory construction, even though controverted
on constitutional theories, remained the same. In attempting to review the decisions of the court, the authors will combine the tort
cases under the particular category of tort law involved. Only those
decisions will be the subject of comment which, in the authors'
opinion, distinguished, clarified, or otherwise modified the existing
law of torts in Colorado.
I.

THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN

1962

A. Physical Facts v. Sworn Testimony
The factual controversies in the tort cases before the court lead
to the reenunciation of the principle that sworn testimony cannot
dispute or set aside established physical facts. In Sevier v. Hendrix,'
the plaintiff, while driving south on an ice and snow covered Valley
Highway, lost control of his car in a skid and came to a complete
stop in the left hand lane of the southbound section of the highway.
Thereafter, he was passed by various cars going in the same direction, until the defendant, driving a truck, ran into him. The defendant claimed that testimony as to the point of impact and as to the
acts of negligence complained of was contrary to the physical evidence and should not be accepted as true, when disputed by mere
eye witness testimony. In refusing to accept the defendant's theory
and in affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court
found that there was not present that requisite state of physical
facts which would clearly indicate an absence of negligence on the
part of the defendant and said:
In the instant case there is not present the requisite
"admitted physical facts" which "clearly" indicate an absence of negligence on the part of the defendant, and the
rule contended for is not applicable. As stated in Swanson
v. Martin, 120 Colo. 361, 209 P.2d 917, 919: ". . . . it is only in
the clearest of cases, when the facts are undisputed and it
is plain that all intelligent men can draw but one inference
from them, that the question is ever one of law for the
court." (Emphasis supplied.) 2
A reverse twist came about when the plaintiff sought to look
to the physical facts to set aside an adverse jury determination in
a controversy involving an intersection collision. In Anderson v.
Lett,3 the plaintiff sought to show that the uncontrovertible phyPartner, Hindry, Erickson & Meyer, Denver.
* Associate, Hindry, Erickson & Meyer, Denver.
1 367 P.2d 750 (Colo. 1962).
2 Id. at 751. See also Elliott v. Hill, 366 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1961).
3 374 P.2d 355 (Colo. 1962).
*
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sical facts established by the evidence forced the conclusion that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law and that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent. The facts, however, were not of
the quality, in the court's opinion, that would justify the plaintiff's
position and caused the court to say:
In the instant case both parties have attempted to use
mathematical formulae to demonstrate the correctness of
their positions. They have applied these formulae to evidence of speed and distance given by the parties which
were but approximations. The application of such formulae
to these approximations demonstrates that but very small
deviations in the estimate of speed or distance factors
would necessarily affect the conclusions to be reached as to
which of these parties entered the intersection against the
red light. Under such circumstances, the question of whether the evidence given by one party or the other conflicted
with scientific principles becomes one for the jury and not
for the court. Conner v. Jones, 115 Ind. App. 660, 59 N.E.
2d 577.
Courts cannot indulge in arbitrary deductions from
scientific laws as applied to evidence except where the
conclusions reached are so irrefutable that no room is left
for the entertainment by reasonable minds of any other
conclusion. Garrison v. Ryno, (Mo.) 328 S.W. 2d 557. Here
it cannot be said that mathematical calculations demonstrate beyond
controversy that Lett was negligent and Linda
4
was not.

B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
A verdict for the plaintiff against alleged joint tort-feasors was
reversed and remanded with directions for a new trial in Chapman
v. Redwine. 5 The majority found that the plaintiff, who was cut by
a pop bottle in a supermarket, had no claim against the bottling
company because the physical facts were contrary to the sworn
testimony. The plaintiff testified that she heard an explosion and
then realized her leg was cut above the ankle and saw glass and
liquid on the floor. Admittedly, the plaintiff did not see any bottle
explode and did not observe any glass or liquid on the display rack
or in any place other than on the floor, and none of the cola was on
her dress. In analyzing the evidence relating to the bottling company, the court said:
It is common knowledge and within the very nature of
things that when and if a bottle filled with liquid resting
on a shelf explodes, glass fragments, liquid, other bottles,
broken or knocked over, remain on the shelf. On the happening of such an event one does not find all of the glass
fragments and liquid in an area about three feet in diameter on a concrete floor some feet away from the shelf
where the bottle was resting and where the explosion is
alleged to have occurred.
The location of the glass and liquid tells the true story
4 Id. at 357.
i 370 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1962).
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much more convincingly than the cry of "explosion" on
which plaintiff predicates her whole case.
To accept plaintiff's story that a bottle exploded on the
shelf, one would have to ignore simple facts of life, shut
one's eyes to reality, substitute fiction and fantasy for fact,
do a complete overhaul job on the law of gravity, and live
in a land of make believe.
Not all noises are explosions. A filled bottle explodes
when the inside pressure is so great as to exceed the containing strength of the bottle ....
Evidence offered by plaintiff to prove that a bottle exploded on a shelf of the display rack was insufficient to
warrant the trial court in submitting the matter to the jury
on the theory of an exploding bottle and it was error to
instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as
applied to exploding bottles.6
However, as to the defendant supermarket, the court found that the
plaintiff was entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
since she was a business invitee and the evidence disclosed that the
defendant supermarket was in the exclusive possession of the building and its contents, which included the bottle which fell or was
knocked from a shelf and broke, causing the injuries in question.
The opinion brought a fiery dissent from Justice Sutton, who
viewed the facts differently than did the majority when they found
that there was no evidence of a sticky substance on the shelf that
held the bottle. Justice Sutton contended that the majority was
invading the province of the jury and acting as the ultimate trier
of the fact and said that the facts called for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to both defendants. The reasoning
which provides the basis for his dissent was that:
1. The plaintiff was in no position to establish the
cause of the explosion or fall of the bottle which resulted
in her injury.
2. The bottler could show that the bottle did not explode, if such were the case, and, the store owner could
show, if such were the case, that the bottle did not fall from
the shelf because of safe construction, ample aisle width
and so forth.
3. A suit against joint tort-feasors under the doctrine
even though finally only one was held liable, has been upheld by our court. Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311
P.2d 711 (1957), (doctor held liable when he, hospital and
anesthetist were joined as defendants when a patient fell
from an operating table). Compare Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (a doctor, nurse,
hospital, patient case).
My position is that under the facts and pleadings of
this case the jury was entitled to find that the bottle exploded and, in the absence of satisfactory proof exonerating
7
them of negligence, could find both defendants liable.
6 Id. at 149.
7 Id. at 153. See also Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.UL. Rev. 167 (1960).
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C. Expert Witnesses
In a far reaching decision, McNelley v. Smith,s the court went
a long way toward restricting the place of the accidentologist in a
controverted automobile collision. The facts in the McNelley case
were disputed, with the principal question being whether McNelley,
while waiting to make a left turn, was struck from behind and
knocked into the path of an oncoming truck, or whether McNelley
pulled into the path of the oncoming truck and was struck and
knocked into the front end of the truck which was following him
on the highway. The highway patrolman played a significant role
in the trial court in resolving the factual dispute by giving his
opinion as to the manner in which the accident occurred. He said
that his opinion was founded in part on the physical facts which
he observed at the scene of the accident and in part on the statement of one of the parties which was taken at the scene of the accident. He had not taken statements from either of the two other
parties involved, because one was dead and the other was unconscious. The officer's testimony related not only to physical facts
which he determined when he investigated the collision, but also
included his opinion regarding the speed of the vehicles involved,
the point of impact, the angle of impact, which he based on the
damage done to each vehicle, and the physical facts at the scene.
In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the court said:
While it is no longer a valid objection in Colorado that
the opinion of an expert witness resolves the ultimate conclusion which the jury is to determine, Bridges v. Lintz,
140 Colo. 582, 346 P.2d 571, evidence of this nature is admissible only when the subject matter is such that a jury
cannot be expected to draw correct inferences from the
facts. There is no need for expert opinion with reference
to facts involving commonplace occurrences. Blackburn v.
Tombling, 148 Colo. -,
365 P.2d 243. Expert testimony is
not admissible solely because the witness has some skill in
a particular field, but it is admissible, if at all, only because
the witness can offer assistance on a matter not within the
knowledge or common experience of people of ordinary
intelligence.
It was competent in this case for the officer to testify
as to the point of impact and the angle of collision, matters
which he determined solely from the physical facts existing
at the scene of the accident. It was not competent for him
to give his opinion as to how the McNelley car got into the
southbound lane of traffic and into the path of the tractor
trailer. From the physical facts testified to by the witnesses,
including the patrolman, it was well within the competency
of the jury to determine the ultimate issue in the case, that
is, by whose negligence the McNelley car was placed in the
path of the oncoming trailer tractorY
After condemning the opinion given by the highway patrolman, the
court went on to place further restrictions on the accidentologist
with the following statement:
S 368 P.2d 555 (Colo. 1962).
9 Id. at 557.
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During presentation of the defense, McNelley too presented an expert who attempted to testify as to the cause
of the accident. This expert's opinion was to be based solely
on photographs of the vehicles taken at the scene of the
accident. Under the circumstances presented here, the trial
court correctly refused to permit this evidence. It is interesting to note that in the cases cited by counsel in defense
of this exclusion the courts have held that jurors of ordinary intelligence are just as capable of reasoning backward
from the evidence in automobile accidents, such as the one
under consideration here, and making a correct analysis as
to what has happened as is the expert.1 0
The ratio decidendi of the decision in McNelley is that an accidentologist may not give his opinion as to the cause of a collision
when the jury is capable of drawing correct inferences from the
facts. The decision properly limits the use of hearsay, but limits and
restricts a long line of cases, commencing with Ison v. Stewart1
and will undoubtedly handicap both the plaintiff and defendant in12
establishing causation with the testimony of an accident expert.
D. The Whiplash - Rear End Collision
Two cases highlighted the oft-complained14 of whiplash injury:
Moseley v. Lamirato13 and Sullivan v. Laman.
Moseley v. Lamirato was a typical rear end collision that was
followed by the plaintiff's recognition of the customary whiplash,
or more correctly speaking, cervical sprain complaints. At the conclusion of the defense case, the trial court directed a verdict on the
issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff. The Lamirato car was
admittedly stopped for traffic, and Moseley said that he failed to
see that traffic was stopped until it was too late to avoid the collision. With the acts of the parties as well defined as they were in the
instant case, the court held that the question of negligence and contributory negligence was one for resolution by the court. 15 However,
the court's duty did not end with the determination of liability, and
the medical testimony relating to the permanency of Lamirato's
injury had to be reviewed. The defendant claimed that the injuries
to the plaintiff's cervical spine were not of a permanent nature and
questioned the right of the treating osteopathic physician to testify
as to the permanency of the injury. The court, however, resolved
the right of the osteopathic fraternity to testify and said that the
issue of permanency and the weight to be given the osteopath's
testimony was a matter for the jury's determination. Also before
the court was the plaintiff's second claim for relief which was directed against a claim service that had allegedly agreed to repair
the Lamirato car and then when the car was to be released had
conditioned payment upon the signing of a general release. The defendant made a belated motion for a separate trial as to the second
claim for relief, and, even though the insurance aspect of the case
10 Id. at 558.
11 105 Colo. 55, 94 P.2d 701 (1939).
12 See Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 229 (1955); cf. Annot., 66 A L.R.2d 1043 (1957).
13 370 P.2d 450 (Colo 1962).
14 375 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1962).
15 See also Ridenour v. Diffee, 133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 (1956); Clark v. Joslin Dry Goods Co.,
128 Colo. 317, 262 P.2d 546 (1953); Grand Junction v. Lashmett, 126 Colo. 256, 247 P.2d 909 (1952).
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became clear to the jury by reason of the second claim for relief,
the court held that the defendant had slept on his rights by not
moving for a separate trial at an earlier time. 6
Sullivan v. Laman17 also involved a rear end collision with the
anomaly of a defense verdict. Again, heavy traffic precipitated the
collision, which formulated the defendant's basis for obtaining an
instruction on unavoidable accident in the trial court. In reversing
and remanding the case for a new trial, because of the trial court's
instruction on unavoidable accident, the court said:
In Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 229 P. (2d) 659 and
Herdt v. Darbin, 126 Colo. 355, 249 P. (2d) 822 we clearly
indicated that the giving of an instruction on 'unavoidable
accident' in a case in which there was no evidence upon
which a finding of such an accident could properly be
based, is reversible error.
Careful examination of the record convinces us that
there is no competent evidence upon which the jury could
reasonably find that the accident was unavoidable and that
the giving of such an instruction constituted reversible
error.
In Jacobsen v. McGinness, 135 Colo. 357, 311 P. (2d) 696
it was said that 'the instruction on unavoidable accident
given by the trial court was erroneous, it tended not only to
divert the minds of the jurors from the decisive issues of
negligence and contributory negligence, but suggested that
under the evidence the parties might be held blameless for
reasons other than their freedom from negligence or contributory negligence.' (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Piper v. Mayer, 145 Colo. 391, 360 P. (2d) 433,
which is a definitive review and analysis of the many recent decisions of this court concerning the propriety of an
instruction on unavoidable accident. In that case we concluded that an instruction on unavoidable accident possesses only 'limited usefulness' and has 'been restricted in
its application to a particular type of case.' Illustrative of
'particular type' of case in which an instruction on unavoidable accident has been held proper, are Ridley v. Young,
127 Colo. 46, 253 P. (2d) 433, (evidence of a locked front
16 Colo. R. Civ. P, 42(b). Cf. Greenspoon v. Parke-Davis, 8 F.R.D. 485 (1948); Young v. Colorado
Nat'l Bank, 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).
17 375 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1962).
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wheel); Parkerv. Couch, 145 Colo. 209, 358 P. (2d) 609 (evidence of a severe dust storm); and Iacino v. Brown, 121
Colo. 450, 217 P. (2d 266 (evidence of mechanical defect in
steering wheel)."'
E. Unavoidable Accident
In Dugan v. Kuner-Empson Co., 19 the plaintiff brought suit for
injuries which he sustained while assisting the defendant's foreman
in loading a barrel of pickles at the defendant's plant. The injury
occurred while the plaintiff was endeavoring to help push the barrel onto his own truck. While the barrel was at an angle, someone
said, "I've got it," and the defendant's foreman released the barrel,
crushing the plaintiff's fingers against the side of his own truck.
The supreme court upheld the defense verdict and the giving of the
following unavoidable accident instruction:
The jury is instructed that if you find from the evidence that the accident was unavoidable,, then none of the
parties is entitled to damages.
An unavoidable accident is one happening suddenly
and unexpectedly and without negligence on the part of
anyone.
In the event that you find that the accident was unavoidable, then you are2 instructed to bring in a verdict in
favor of the defendant.
The court concluded that the giving of the instruction was necessary
to a proper presentation of the defendant's theory of the case and
said, after considering the record: "The jury could easily have concluded from the evidence in this case that neither party was at fault
and that
this was an unexpected, sudden and unforeseeable acci21
dent.
F. Common Frolic
In Myers v. Myers,2 2 a husband and wife imbibed freely of the
cup before the husband entered into the serious task of driving.
When a collision occurred, with the husband driving while intoxicated, the wife sued alleging willful and wanton conduct to avoid
the guest statute. Instructions were given on contributory negligence and assumption of risk over the defendant wife's objection,
and a defense verdict was returned. In upholding the giving of the
instructions, the court said:
This court has on many occasions since 1936 clearly and
concisely held that where a claim is made by a passenger
of an automobile for injuries as a result of the intoxication
or wilfulness and wantonness of the driver, instructions to
the jury on contributory negligence and assumption of risk
are proper if there is evidence justifying their submission.
[Citations omitted.] The instructions given in the instant
case on these
issues were complete and proper under the
23
evidence.
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 93.
369 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 84.
Ibid.
375 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 527.
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G. Malpractice
Two cases found their way to the supreme court which involved alleged malpractice by those engaged in the healing arts.
Chiropractic practices gave rise to the first controversy. In Klimkiewicz v. Karnick,2' 4 the court set aside a substantial jury verdict
for the plaintiff which had been based on a chiropractor's negligence. The plaintiff, a school teacher, engaged the defendant chiropractor to give her heat treatments and to adjust and manipulate
her arm and shoulder. During the course of the treatment, according to the plaintiff, the defendant suddenly and with tremendous
force yanked her right arm, thereby causing permanent damage to
its muscles and nerves. It was stipulated that the defendant's techniques were part of proper chiropractic treatment. The defendant's
chiropractic experts testified that the injuries complained of could
not have occurred from the treatment which was rendered. Orthopedic experts, however, in answer to hypothetical questions which
included disputed facts, gave testimony which tied the chiropractic
treatment to the injury. The supreme court condemned as presenting an improper measure of the chiropractor's duties instructions
defining ordinary care as that exercised by a person of ordinary
intelligence and prudence under similar circumstances. They held
that the proper test was whether or not the defendant chiropractor
had treated the plaintiff in accordance with the principles and
standards of his school of medicine as measured by the ordinary
skill and care afforded by other members of his profession in the
same community who were engaged in the same line of practice.
They also found instructions given on life expectancy improper,
because no evidence was contained in the record to establish the
plaintiff's age.
In McCarty v. Goldstein2 5 the supreme court upheld a summary judgment2" which was entered in favor of a dentist in a malpractice action on the basis of the two-year statute of limitations.2 7
Prior to the entry of the summary judgment, the plaintiff had
moved to strike the affirmative plea of the two-year statute of
limitations, alleging that the limitative statute was violative of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article
V, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. The plaintiff's theory
for striking the allegation, when summarized, was that Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953) (the two-year statute of limitations), constituted special legislation. The supreme court, however, found that
the classification set forth in the statute was reasonable and had a
reasonable relationship to the persons dealt with and to the public
purposes sought to be achieved by the legislation and, therefore,
was constitutional.
H. Last Clear Chance
In Sedlmayr v. Lung,2 the plaintiff's husband was killed when
he was struck by the defendant's car while he was riding a horse.
The pleadings raised issues of the defendant's negligence, contribu24
25
26
27
28

372 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1962).
376 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962).
Colo. R. Civ. P. 56.
Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 87-1-6 (1953).
372 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1962).
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tory negligence of the deceased, unavoidable accident, and last clear
chance. A defense verdict was rendered and error was predicated
upon the failure of the trial court to grant a proper instruction on
last clear chance. The defendant, in turn, alleged cross-error, because a verdict had not been directed in his favor. In examining the
record, the court found that there was no evidence that the defendant had an opportunity to avoid the accident or knew or should
have known of the presence of the deceased until the horse carrying the deceased plunged into the right side of his car. In holding
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defense motion
for a directed verdict and in giving an instruction on last clear
chance, the court again set forth the measure for giving an instruction on last clear chance and said:
To make the last clear chance doctrine applicable, it
must be established, independent of the doctrine itself, that
the defendant after the peril of the injured party arose, was
chargeable with negligence constituting a proximate cause
of the injury. In the instant case there was no evidence to
show a failure on the part of defendant to exercise ordinary
care, either before, or at the time of, the accident.
The doctrine of last clear chance pre-supposes a perilous situation created or existing through the negligence of
both plaintiff and defendant, but it is assumed that there
was a time after such negligence had occurred when the defendant could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of
means available, avert the accident ....
Before a case may be submitted to a jury with an instruction on last clear chance, there must be evidence in
the record" that defendant had a clear chance to avoid the
collision. 9
I. Liability of a Landowner
Elsworth v. Colorado Beverage Co. " was a slip and fall case in
which a landowner obtained a summary judgment that the supreme
court sustained. The defendant landowner operated a beverage company which abutted a publicly owned street which was sometimes
used for parking. The plaintiff fell on ice that appeared on the
street abutting the defendant's property. The court held that even
though the defendant's customers did park on the public street adjoining the defendant's building, the defendant did not have a duty
to keep the public street free from ice, when the ice and snow complained of did not result from the affirmative acts of the defendant.
J. Intervening Cause
In Jensen v. South Adams County Water Dist.,"' a fourteen
year old girl sued the defendant water company for injuries which
she suffered when her foot slipped into the defendant's water meter
box which had the cover plate removed. The meter box in question
was covered with a cast iron plate that was held in place by a manysided nut. Below the cover plate was a frost plate which was not
29 Id. at 950.
30 370 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1962).
31 368 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1962).

TORTS

secured by any device. The plaintiff was injured when she stepped
on the frost plate which tilted and caused her to fall and sustain
her injuries. She charged that the defendant water company was
not only negligent in failing to provide a proper securing device to
keep the cover plate in position, but also was negligent in failing
to properly secure the cover plate on the meter. Testimony was
offered by the defendant to establish that the meter had been read
and the cover plate secured three weeks before the tragedy, and
that boys had been seen removing the cover plate prior to the time
that the injury occurred. A defense verdict was obtained but was
set aside by the supreme court; a new trial was ordered because
of the instructions given to the jury. It was the defendant's contention that the acts of third parties without knowledge or fault
on the defendant's part created an efficient intervening cause, and
instructions were given which would exonerate the defendant from
liability if the cover plate was removed by third parties.
The defendant also obtained an instruction relating to the necessity of notice of a dangerous condition before it became the defendant's duty to remedy the same. In reversing the trial court, the supreme court held that notice to the defendant of a dangerous or
defective condition is a non-essential element to recovery when the
defective or dangerous condition was created as a result of the defendant's negligence. The court found that the question of the propriety of using a fastener of the type used by the defendant to keep
the cover plate in a safe position was an issue for the jury to determine. The court also found that the instruction which freed the
defendant from fault if the cover was removed by a third person
was error, because in Colorado it was a jury question as to whether
the proximate cause of the injury was a result of the combined negligence of the defendant and the negligence or wrongful act of a
third person. An injury, said the court, which is the result of the
combined negligence of the defendant and the negligence or wrongful act of a third person, for whose act neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant is responsible, creates liability on behalf of the defendant,
when the injury would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence.
II.

WILD ANIMALS

A coyote was declared to be a wild animal which would cause
its owner to suffer absolute liability for injuries inflicted by the
coyote in Collins v. Otto.32 Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the su-

preme court, ruled that a coyote was a wild animal with vicious
propensities which placed its owner in the position that he kept the
animal at his peril. In the trial court, a defense verdict was rendered after instructions were given that included contributory negligence of the four year old child who was the subject of the
coyote's attack. In reversing, the supreme court remanded the case
for retrial on the issue of damages alone.
III.

WRONGFUL DEATH

The supreme court found the much controverted "net pecuniary
loss rule" to be the subject of constitutional attack in two cases:2 369 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1962).
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Herbertson v. RussellV and Kogul v. Sonheim.3 4 In the Herbertson
case, the six year old daughter of the plaintiffs was crushed under
the rear wheels of a gravel truck. In the trial court, damages were
awarded in the sum of $25,000.00. In reversing the case, with directions for a new trial on the issue of damages alone, the supreme
court found that even though damages for a wrongful death need
not and cannot generally be proven with mathematical certainty,
there still exists the requirement that damages be shown to have
occurred at least with a reasonable degree of certainty from the
wrongful death. The court found that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the award of $25,000.00. In remanding the
case, the court recognized that loss of the right to a child's earnings
during her minority were properly the subject of compensation, as
was the right of the parents to assistance from their daughter during their declining years. However, the court reiterated the oftrepeated rule that damages in a wrongful death case are compensatory only, and may not be exemplary in the sense that they are
imposed as a penalty against the wrongdoer or a solatium for the
grief of the death of their minor child. No evidence was found by
the court which would justify the $25,000.00 award which was made
by the court. In giving new life to Pierce v. Connor,'", the court
emphasized the fact that the legislature had reenacted a statute
which had received a settled judicial construction and had amended
only the limitation on the amount of recovery and by reenactment
had established that the legislative intent was that the judiciary
should adhere to its former constructions of the statute.
Justice Frantz, supported by Justice Moore and Justice Pringle
who dissented, concurred in supporting the reversal, but refused to
accept the reasoning of the majority opinion. Justice Frantz questioned the constitutionality of the statute as being violative of the
inalienable rights, : 6 equality of justice.37 and due process 3 provisions of the state constitution.
Justice Frantz analyzed the damages to a parent in the following language:
When these relationships [parent and child] are disrupted, either by injury or death, what damages should be
visited upon the wrong-doer? The damages should be the
natural product of the act. These damages involve mental
anguish, loss of love and affection, the society and companionship, the loss of protection and comfort, and the loss
of the decedent's earnings, if any, resulting from the injury
or death. [Citations omitted.]
Because of what has been said in this opinion, I would
say that two natural rights are violated, the right of the
individual in that her life has been taken, and the rights of
her family and the members thereof, and
that damages
39
should be allowed in both these respects.
In Kogul v. Sonheim,40 which could easily be said to be the
"3
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

371 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1962).
372 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1962).
20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 721 (1894).
Colo. Const. art. II, § 3.
Colo. Const. art. II, § 6.
Colo. Const. art. II, § 25.
Note 33 supra at 430.
Note 34 supra.
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most talked about decision of the year, the court, construing Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 41-1-1 (1953) in the strictest terms, held that an award
of $700.00 for the wrongful death of a three-year-old child was not
grossly inadequate when measured by the net pecuniary loss. In
the Kogul case, a child was killed when the defendant's spot welder, which was stored near the plaintiff's property, in an elevated
and unstable place, fell on top of him. The theory of the plaintiff's
case was that the defendant had created an attractive nuisance and
that the damages for wrongful death must necessarily include the
reasonable replacement value of the child including the cost of
infantile hospitalization, care, clothing, support and education up
to the time of the child's death and such other expenses as would
be necessarily incurred in the raising of the child. The bereaved
parents found that in Colorado the following instruction has the
approval of the supreme court:
The net pecuniary or monetary loss, if any, which the
plaintiffs might reasonably have expected to receive from
the continuation of his life less the cost
4 of properly and
suitably maintaining and educating him. '
After the giving of such an instruction, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the parents against the owner of the spot welder
for $700.00. In upholding the verdict, the court refused to accept
the liberal interpretation given to similar statutes in other states
and said that any change in our law must come from the legislature. 42 The court's decision found Justice Moore concurring specially and questioning the constitutional arguments which were
voiced by Justice Frantz and Justice Hall in their dissent. Justice
Frantz, dissenting again looked to the constitution for support of
his argument and said:
For us to sanction a judgment in this amount on the
theory that only net pecuniary loss represents the measure
of damages where the boy's death resulted from fault is to
defer to an essentially materialistic tenet discordant with
the word and spirit of the Constitution of this state. Materialism and our Bill of Rights are intrinsically antagonistic.
I cannot believe that the "natural, essential and inalienable" right to enjoy life, given measured recognition in the
Bill of Rights (Art. II, Sec. 3, Const. Colo.) is, in this case,
41 Ibid.

42 Cf. Wyco v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347,
113 N.W.2d 355 (1961).
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just a beautiful aspiration and nothing more. Yet that is
the effect of the majority opinion. For all that remains, at
most, is the moral right to enjoy life; the right recognized
by law-indeed, guaranteed by the Constitution-is little
more than nothing in a juridical sense.
I would have this constitutional provision be more than
"sonority without content," more than "sounding brass,"
more than the subject of patriotic orations. It is our solemn
duty to give these words of the Bill of Rights their mandatory meaning and not reduce them to a hortatory significance.
The "right" to enjoy life envisages "duty" as its correlative. A right without a corresponding duty is semantic
emasculation. A legal right with only a corresponding moral
duty is jurisprudentially a solecism. A right in law loses its
true traditional dimension when not complemented by a
duty in law. Neither can stand alone and free of the other
without rendering both meaningless.
Other courts in recent times have been vexed with the
same problem. Some have refused to kowtow to stare decisis
on less tenable grounds than I propose. Indeed, these courts
have re-interpreted their wrongful death statutes, and in so
doing have expanded the measure of damages beyond net
pecuniary loss, to permit recovery for loss of the comfort,
4
society, assistance and protection of the deceased. 3
IV.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In Spaur v. City of Greeley4 4 the court ruled that an aircraft
owner who uses a municipal airport stands in the position of a
bailee for hire and may look to the municipality for damages which
were occasioned as a result of the bailment. The plaintiff's aircraft
suffered damage as a result of being negligently tied down at the
Greeley Municipal Airport. When suit was brought in the county
court, a motion to dismiss was made and honored on the theory of
sovereign immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Thereafter, the matter was appealed to the
district court and again dismissed on the theory of sovereign immunity. The supreme court, in following its earlier pronouncement
in Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 4 held
that sovereign immunity does not exist when contracts of a local
governmental unit are involved.
V.

CLAIMS MADE UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT

The supreme court held that a claimant must show that an
accident or overexertion proximately caused the fatal heart attack
for which death benefits are being sought in Industrial Comm'n of
Colo. v. Hesler.46 In the Hesler case, a widow filed for death benefits for her husband, who was a road grade operator. Admittedly, the deceased was operating the road grader at the time of his
death and within the scope of his employment, but under the
43
44
45
46

Note 34
372 P.2d
136 Colo.
370 P.2d

supro at 735.
730 (Colo. 1962).
19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
428 (Colo. 1962).
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statute,47 the court ruled that the death must be as a result of an
accident which was not the cause of the injury in the instant case.
In handing down the Hesler decision, the court said that the denial
of benefits was proper, because the evidence created only an inference that the death occurred from overexertion while the deceased was employed, and that the weight to be afforded this evidence rested within the discretion of the Commission. See also
4
Watson v. Merritt,
M where a widow was refused death benefits for
the death of her husband, who had a coronary occlusion while
lifting a woman because there was no showing that he died performing a duty normally performed by him while rendering aid
to a patient.
In Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Standard Ins. Co.,' the court
declared that an employer is liable for the ultimate permanent disability suffered by an employee under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, even though such disability may have been partially or wholly
the result of unsuccessful or negligent treatment by a physician
furnished by the employer. However, the doctor is a third person
under the Act, and, where the employee settled the malpractice
suit against the doctor, the employer was entitled to a right of
subrogation against the employee for that amount of money.
The supreme court was faced with the question of determining
when this state has jurisdiction over a compensation claim in R.C.S.
Lumber Co. v. Worthy."' Here, the claimant was killed in New
Mexico, but had been in Colorado performing work for his employer. The claimant filed under Colorado compensation law, and
the court said that any two of the following three requirements
will give this state jurisdiction:
1. A contract of employment created in Colorado.
2. Employment in Colorado under a contract created outside of the state.
3. Substantial employment in Colorado.
After setting forth the requirements, the court did not find
that two of the three requirements were present and, therefore,
denied the claim. Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc.,"1 stands as authority for the proposition that the Commission must go by the medical reports and testimony given at
the hearing. In the principal case, the district court reversed the
referee who gave a 5% disability from an injury when the testimony of both doctors at the hearing was that only 21/2 % of the
claimant's disability could be allocated to this injury, and the ruling
of the district court was sustained by the supreme court.
-'
In Watson v. Merritt,"*
the supreme court reiterated the rule
that in workmen's compensation cases the rules of evidence are
generally the same as they are in civil suits, and that where an employer who was also an examining physician made admissions and
declarations against the interest of his defense, the admissions constituted prima facie evidence against him. Moreover, the admissions,
47 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-12-2(3) (1953).
48 369 P.2d 989 (Colo. 1962).
41) 370 P.2d 156 (Colo, 1962).
50 369 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1962).
51 367 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1962).
52 Note 48 supro.
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in the opinion of the court, could be treated by the trier of facts as
proof of the facts to which they related.
Where the employee's employer is doing a job with another
employer as a joint venture, the employees may be entitled to the
workmen's compensation coverage from either of the two employers. 53 In this case the claimant was injured while working for
Snyder, who came within the Workmen's Compensation Act, but
had not taken out insurance. Snyder had agreed, however, with
Dillie that they would by joint venture do the particular job in
question. Dillie voluntarily elected to go under the Act. On the
job it appears that there were less than four men and that Snyder,
who was the employer who hired the claimant, was not covered
by insurance. The court held that the joint venturers could not
limit their workmen's compensation coverage by a private agreement and that under their joint venture agreement they were each
liable as though each had done the hiring and the claimant was
entitled to make a claim against both Snyder and Dillie for compensation benefits.
The court interpreted the following portion of Colo. 54
Rev. Star.
§ 81-13-5 (1953) in Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Pearcy:
The right to compensation and benefits, as provided by
this chapter, shall be barred unless within six months after
the injury . . . a notice claiming compensation shall be

filed with the commission. This limitation shall not apply
to any claimant to whom compensation has been paid ....
(Emphasis supplied.) 71
By virtue of Pearcy, it is now clear that the legislature must
have meant compensation paid under Colorado law only and not
compensation within a period of six months which might have
been paid in any other state.
In Gugas v. Industrial Comm'n,5 6 the claimant requested compensation for an injury which occurred in February of 1960, but
relied on an accident which occurred at an earlier time under
different circumstances. At the hearing, evidence and medical reports were tendered describing an accident which the claimant
experienced in March of 1958 and which allegedly was the "accident" upon which the claimant relied. In denying recovery, the
supreme court said:
We know of no authority holding that a claimant may
assert a claim for workmen's compensation based exclusively on an event allegedly occurring at a particular time
and place, and, upon failure to prove a compensable injury,
to be awarded compensation for an accident which occurred
two years prior to the event on which the claim is based,
and which occurred at 5a7 different place and under wholly
different circumstances.

Justice Sutton dissented in the Gugas case on the theory that
the two accidents were directly connected.
,3
54
55
56
57

Industrial Comm'n v. Lopez, 371 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1962).
369 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 562.
374 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 703.
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VI.

MISCELLANEOUS TORT CASES OF INTEREST

A. Libel
The technical niceties and distinctions between libel per se and
libel per quod were the subject of analysis and definition in Bernstein v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.5s The defendant credit agency had
published a report relating to the financial condition of a corporation. The report set forth that the financial information was taken
"from an unaudited interim financial statement submitted directly
by Harry Bernstein, CPA," and that Bernstein had failed to respond
to a request for an interview. The plaintiff's contention was that
the report contained information and statements that were libelous
per se. The defendant filed both a motion to dismiss and a motion
for bill of particulars; the motion for bill of particulars was granted.
The plaintiff refused to provide a bill of particulars as to the special
damages claimed and elected to stand on his complaint, rather than
to amend to meet the trial court's requirements. The trial court dismissed the case, and the supreme court affirmed and provided the
following analysis of the law of libel in Colorado:
This brings us to the crucial issue of whether the statements in question constituted libel per se or libel per quod.
At the early common law all libel, of whatever kind,
was actionable without the pleading or proof of special
damages. Gradually, however, there developed in American
jurisprudence a distinction between libel per se and libel
per quod to the effect that any libel which carried its defamatory imputation on its face was actionable wi'hout an
allegation or proof of damages. See for example McKenzie
v. Denver Times, 3 Colo. App. 554, 34 P. 577 (1893). But any
libel which did not carry such imputation on its face was
held to be actionable only where special damages were
pleaded and proved ....

Later, further gloss was added to

this area of the law, and today the rule accepted by the
majority of courts may be stated as follows:
"Any libel which carriefs] its defamatory imputation
upon its face fis] still held to be actionable without proof
of damages. But any libel which [does] not [is] held to be
actionable only where slander would be actionable-which
is to say, when special damage was pleaded and proved, or
the case fell into one of the four exceptional slander categories, of the imputation of crime, loathsome disease, defamation affecting business, or unchastity on the part of a
woman." Prosser, "Libel Per Quod", 46 Va.L.Rev. 838, 844
(1960).
We point out here that Dean Prosser in the article
above cited states that all of this rule is applicable in Colorado on the basis of Knapp supra. A careful reading of the
Knapp case indicates that not all of the quoted rule is extractable therefrom, the reason being that in Knapp it was
not necessary to determine the exceptions based on slander
per se and the court did not do so, nor do we do so now
though we do not disagree with it.
58 368 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1962).
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It is within the context of these principles that these
alleged defamatory statements must be analyzed. The statements appeared on a Rating-Change Report of defendant
concerning the financial condition of a Colorado corporation engaged in the retail jewelry business. Plaintiff contends that a libel is apparent on the face of statements that
the Rating-Change Report was "prepared from unaudited
interim financial statement submitted directly by Harry
Bernstein, CPA." and that "...
Bernstein does not respond
to request for interview."
We cannot say that it is defamatory on the face of a
commercial report to state that an accountant checked on
a retail jewelry corporation and took its business accounts
and entries at their face value. This, in effect, is all that the
statement "prepared from unaudited interim financial
statement" alleges. It must be remembered that to constitute libel per se the libelous elements must be clearly expressed in the printed article. See Rocky Mt. News Printing
Co. v. Fridborn, 46 Colo. 440, 104 P. 956, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 891
(1909). And, in determining whether words are libelous
they are to be given their ordinary and popular meaning.
Knapp supra, 111 Colo. at 499, 144 P. 2d at 981; Prosser,
"Law of Torts", Second Edition (1955) at page 580. Nor is
it apparent how the mere statement that a Rating-Change
Report was prepared from an unaudited interim financial
statement affords any imputation of incompetence, dishonesty, or misconduct which is incompatible with the
proper conduct of plaintiff's profession or business. See
generally Prosser supra at pages 590-92. ":
B. Conversion
The limitations and prerequisites to recovery for conversion
caused the plaintiff's complaint to fail in the trial court and again
60
in the supreme court in McCartney v. Foster.
The action against
the defendant sheriff, in the opinion of the court, was properly
dismissed by the trial court, because the deputy, who took the
disputed property into his possession, was not discharging an
official duty.6 1 Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff necessarily had to fail as to the remaining defendant, who was the person
responsible for the taking of the property, because no proper demand had been made for the return of the property, and no evidence was offered to show that the property was improperly taken.
59 Id. at 783-84. See also Note, Torts-Libel Per Quad and Special Damages,
580 (1962).
60 374 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1962).
61 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 35-5-5 (1953).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COUNTY UNIT
SYSTEM - ELECTION
A qualified voter in Fulton County, Georgia, instituted an action in the federal district court to enjoin the defendant from using
the county unit system' as a basis for counting votes in a primary
for nominating a United States Senator and other statewide officers. The plaintiff alleged that the county unit system of counting,
tabulating and certifying votes cast in primary elections for statewide offices violated the seventeenth amendment 2 and the equal
protection clause and due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." The district court issued the injunction stating that the county unit system as applied4 violated the equal protection clause. Held,
(1) that the primary constituted "state action" within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment; (2) that the plaintiff had standing
to sue; and (3) that a justiciable case was stated. However, on the
merits of the case, the Supreme Court declared the county unit
system unconstitutional and stated that the language of the Constitution "can mean only one thing-one person, one vote." Gray v.
Sanders, 83 Sup. Ct. 801 (1963).
The Supreme Court until Baker v. Carr' had refused to hear
cases dealing with legislative apportionment on the ground that
they presented "political questions.

'6

Colegrove v. Green,7 an Illi-

nois case dealing with congressional reapportionment which was
decided on the grounds of Wood v. Broom,s was the beginning of
the more recent approach by the Supreme Court to the legislative
apportionment questions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, in writing
the opinion in Colegrove, that the Constitution gives Congress the
exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the states in
the House, and, to compel Congress to reapportion itself and thus
involve the judiciary in politics would be hostile to our democratic
system.9
Since Colegrove v. Green,'0 there has been a series of cases"
appealed to the Supreme Court dealing with both congressional and
I Go. Code Ann. § 34-3212 (1936). The county unit system at the time this case was filed is as
follows: (1) Candidates for nomination who received the highest number of popular votes in a
county were considered to have carried the county and to be entitled to two votes for each representative to which the county is entitled in the lower House of the General Assembly; (2) the
majority of the county unit vote nominated the United States Senator and Governor, the plurality of
the county unit vote nominated the others.
2 U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
3 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 The district court said that the county unit system could be used if there was no greater disparity against a county than existed against any state in the conduct of national elections.
) 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
7 Ibid.
8 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
9 328 U.S. at 556.
10 See note 6 supra.
11 Congressional redistricting: Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947). Redistricting state legislatures: Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (Okla. State Leg.); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920
(1956) (Tenn. State Leg.); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (Pa. General Asm.). Georgia county
unit system for primary elections: Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 276 (1950) (gubernatorial and senatorial
primary); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (gubernatorial and senatorial primary); Cook v.
Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (congressional and gubernatorial primary).
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state reapportionment. The Court-not distinguishing between state
and congressional reapportionment-denied the appeals on the
grounds that they dealt with "political questions" and want of
equity.'" However, in 1962, the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,'"
in reversing a federal district court decision, 1 4 said that this case
unlike Colegrove dealt with redistricting the state legislature and
not congressional redistricting and thus there was no conflict between coequal branches of the government and the Court could
render a decision on the merits of the case. Thus Colegrove was
not overruled in Baker v. Carr but only distinguished.
There have been seven casesl' appealed to the Supreme Court
dealing with the county unit system or congressional redistricting
in Georgia since Colegrove v. Green-four cases1 6 prior to Baker
v. Carr and three cases 1 7 since. The four cases"8 prior to Baker
were dismissed by the Court without hearing argument on the
merits. In dismissing the appeals, the Supreme Court either cited
Colegrove v. Green and lack of jurisdiction or mootness of the
question. In the three cases since Baker the district court has
rendered a decision in each.
In the instant case, 19 the district court, relying on Baker, decided the case on its merits and gave equitable relief by issuing
an injunction against conducting primaries under the present
county unit system.
In Toombs v. Fortson2° the district court, in rendering a decision on the merits of the case, found that the Georgia General Assembly was malapportioned and directed apportionment of at least
one body of the assembly according to population.
However, in Wesberry v. Vandiver,' the plaintiff sought to
have the Court declare invalid the Georgia Act, 22 which established
the ten districts for the election of the members to the United
States House of Representatives. The district court, citing Colegrove v. Green' 3 denied the injunction on the grounds that it was
a "political issue" and stated that the plaintiff could seek relief
in the form of congressional action.
Of the three cases,2' 4 the Supreme Court has rendered a decision only on the county unit system case of Gray v. Sanders.25 The
Court distinguished this case from Baker v. Carr26 by saying that
12 Ibid.

13 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
14 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
15 Gray v. Sanders, 83 Sup. Ct. 801 (1963); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); South v. Peters,
339 U.S. 276 (1950); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946);
Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276
(N.D. Go, 1962).
16 Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Cook v. Fortson,
329 U.S. 675 (1946); Turman v. Duckworth, 339 U.S. 675 (1946).
17 Gray v. Sanders, 83 Sup. Ct. 801 (1963); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Go. 1962);
Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Go. 1962).
18 See note 16 supra.
19 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
20 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Go. 1962).
21 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
22 Ga. Code Ann. § 34-2301 (1936).
23 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
24 See note 17 supra.
25 83 Sup. Ct. 801 (1963).
26 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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it was not a reapportionment case as the district court had treated
27
it but rather only a voting case similar to 2Nixon v. Herndon,
Nixon v. Condon,2 and Smith v. Allwright."
Even though Gray v. Sanders0 did not contain the issue of
congressional redistricting in the sense of the election of a Representative, it did deal with the question of selecting a United States
Senator. The Supreme Court by distinguishing this case from Baker
v. Carr3 1 and designating it as a voting case has side-stepped the
issue at hand-the necessity of judicial action on congressional
reapportionment!
John M. Pierce
27 273
28 286
29 321
34) See
1 See

US.
US.
U.S.
note
note

536 (1927).
73 (1932).
649 (1944).
25 supra.
26 supra.
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BAR BRIEFS
OPINION NO. 28
OF THE ETHCS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED MAY 18, 1963
SYLLABUS

When a member of a law firm is elected or appointed to a fulltime governmental office, not in the judiciary, he may properly
retain membership in his firm if he intends to resume active practice after he completes the term of his office.
FACTS

An attorney who is a member of a law firm is elected or appointed to a governmental office, not in the judiciary, which will
require that he devote his full time to the discharge of his official
duties during the term of his office. Should he, prior to assuming
the duties of his public office, resign from his firm, and should his
name be removed from the firm name?
OPINION

The Committee is of the opinion that the Canons of Professional
Ethics do not require an attorney who is elected or appointed to a
governmental office, not in the judiciary, to resign from his law
firm when it is his intention at the time of his election or appointment, to resume active practice with his firm after he completes
the term of his public office. (See Opinion 192 of the Committee on
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.) However,
when an attorney enters governmental service he should exercise
care to see that no imposition or deception is practiced through the
continued association of his name with his firm. Accordingly, we
believe good practice requires that the words " (on temporary leave
of absence)," "(in governmental service)" or words of similar import be added to the firm letterhead and the firm identification
placard, immediately following the name of the attorney who has
entered governmental service.
It should be observed that an attorney who retains membership
in his firm after entering governmental service may thereby disqualify his firm, for either statutory or ethical reasons, from representing the interests of clients before certain governmental agencies.
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